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Does Enforcement Reduce 
Voluntary Tax Compliance? 
Leandra Lederman* 
Governments generally use enforcement methods, such as audits and 
the imposition of penalties, to deter noncompliance with tax laws. 
Although this approach is consistent with most economic modeling of tax 
compliance, some scholars caution that enforcement may backfire, 
“crowding out” taxpayers’ intrinsic motivations to pay taxes to such an 
extent that they reduce their tax payments. This Article analyzes the 
existing evidence to determine if this occurs. In fact, field studies suggest 
that enforcement tools, such as audits, are very effective deterrents. A few 
recent studies have found that audits have a negative effect on the 
subsequent tax payments of those found compliant on audit. This outcome, 
while perhaps initially surprising, is consistent with the deterrence model; 
a favorable outcome after audit may lower that taxpayer’s perceived 
likelihood of subsequent audit and the perceived magnitude of 
any sanction. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The United States (U.S.) federal income tax requires taxpayers 
to self-report income on a tax return, which provides an 
opportunity for cheating.1 The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) 
generally operates from the intuitive perspective that enforcing the 
tax laws—by auditing a percentage of taxpayers and imposing 
penalties where appropriate—fosters compliance.2 However, a 
number of scholars have argued that tax enforcement may “crowd 
 
 1. Tax noncompliance includes unintentional mistakes, legal tax avoidance, and 
intentional evasion. The Internal Revenue Service distinguishes between filing, reporting, 
and payment noncompliance. Understanding the Tax Gap, I.R.S. Fact Sheet FS-2005-14 (Mar. 
2005), https://www.irs.gov/newsroom/understanding-the-tax-gap. This Article focuses on 
tax evasion and generally on intentional underreporting, and thus underpayment, of 
taxes due. 
 2. IRS Audits, IRS, https://www.irs.gov/businesses/small-businesses-self-employ 
ed/irs-audits (stating that the purpose of audits is to “to verify the reported amount of tax is 
correct”) (last updated Aug. 23, 2018). Various things may trigger an audit, including 
indicators of noncompliance, audits of related taxpayers, and (less often) random selection. 
See id. 
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out” intrinsic motivations to comply with the tax laws.3 For 
example, Benno Torgler has stated, “When monitoring and penal-
ties for noncompliance are intensified, individuals notice that 
extrinsic motivation has increased, which . . . crowds out their 
intrinsic motivation to comply with taxes.”4 Some of these scholars 
argue that enforcement ultimately will have the perverse effect of 
reducing voluntary tax compliance.5 
Because enforcement resources are scarce, with tax collectors 
such as the IRS quite underfunded,6 it would be valuable to know 
whether decreasing enforcement could increase tax compliance, 
even in particular situations. Accordingly, this Article analyzes the 
empirical literature on deterrence and crowding out, in order to 
determine if there are contexts in which enforcement may backfire. 
As there is some evidence in non-tax contexts that external 
motivators may displace internal ones, Part I of the Article 
examines that literature so as to gain greater understanding of the 
 
 3. See, e.g., Michael Doran, Tax Penalties and Tax Compliance, 46 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 111, 
135 (2009) (“[H]arsh tax penalties . . . should not be aimed at taxpayers who respond to tax-
compliance norms because the harsh penalties will undercut the norms and crowd out 
compliance . . . .”); Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Tax Compliance as the Result of a Psychological 
Tax Contract: The Role of Incentives and Responsive Regulation, 29 LAW & POL’Y 102, 105 (2007); 
Dan M. Kahan, Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 81 B.U. L. REV. 333, 338 (2001) (“Material 
incentives can also suppress reciprocal cooperation by crowding out moral motivations.”); 
Yair Listokin & David M. Schizer, I Like to Pay Taxes: Taxpayer Support for Government Spending 
and the Efficiency of the Tax System, 66 TAX L. REV. 179, 203 (2013) (“[A] range of sanctions can 
be explored for noncompliance, including not just cash payments, which are the most likely 
to crowd out pro-social motivations and may even signal that noncompliance is acceptable 
so long as the non-complier pays for the privilege . . . .”). 
 4. Benno Torgler, Moral Suasion: An Alternative Tax Policy Strategy? Evidence from a 
Controlled Field Experiment in Switzerland, 5 ECON. GOV. 235, 236 (2004). 
 5. See Dan M. Kahan, The Logic of Reciprocity: Trust, Collective Action, and Law, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 71, 83 (2003) (“[E]vidence suggests that when taxpayers are exposed to 
information highlighting the penalties for evasion, they respond . . . by contributing less.”); 
cf. Marjorie E. Kornhauser, Normative and Cognitive Aspects of Tax Compliance: Literature Review 
and Recommendations for the IRS Regarding Individual Taxpayers, in 2 NATIONAL TAXPAYER 
ADVOCATE 2007 ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 138, 151 (“The commoditization of a behavior 
crowds out positive normative influences on that behavior. Thus, setting a price or giving an 
economic incentive for behavior motivated by social, non-pecuniary motives such as 
reciprocity can actually decrease the desired behavior.”). 
 6. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, The IRS, Politics, and Income Inequality, 150 TAX NOTES 
1329, 1330–32 (2016) (showing IRS budget cuts and discussing their impact); General Report 
of the Internal Revenue Service Advisory Council, IRS (2014), https://www.irs.gov/tax 
-professionals/2014-irsac-general-report (“In IRSAC’s view, the IRS is in the midst of an 
existential funding crisis.”). 
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crowding-out phenomenon. Part II turns to the tax context, 
analyzing the empirical literature on the effects of sanctions on tax 
compliance, which generally finds that enforcement techniques, 
such as audit threats, increase compliance. Part III focuses on the 
extent to which crowding out occurs in the tax-compliance  
context, discussing what experimental taxpaying games and field 
experiments involving actual taxpayers have shown. 
The Article concludes that enforcement generally has a strong, 
positive effect on tax compliance and that audits are a very 
productive tool for a tax collector such as the IRS. While there is 
some evidence that audits may result in reduced tax payments by 
self-employed taxpayers who, on audit, are found not to owe 
anything, that result is consistent with the deterrence model. 
I. CROWDING OUT IN THEORY AND PRACTICE 
A basic economic approach suggests that the more you pay for 
something the more of it you receive—a price effect.7 Conversely, 
penalties should reduce the penalized behavior. Crowding-out 
theory predicts the opposite result—paying (or paying more)  
for something will reduce the amount received, and penalizing  
it will increase it.8 Although the crowding-out prediction is 
counterintuitive, scholars have made it in several contexts, as 
discussed below.9 
Most of the studies testing crowding-out effects involve 
rewards rather than sanctions.10 In an economic sense, rewards  
and sanctions are variations on the same theme, with a fine or  
other sanction simply a negative reward.11 However, they are not 
 
 7. See Bruno S. Frey & Felix Oberholzer-Gee, The Cost of Price Incentives: An Empirical 
Analysis of Motivation Crowding-Out, 87 AM. ECON. REV. 746, 746 (1997). 
 8. Marianne Promberger & Theresa M. Marteau, When Do Financial Incentives Reduce 
Intrinsic Motivation? Comparing Behaviors Studied in Psychological and Economic Literatures, 32 
HEALTH PSYCHOL. 950, 953 (2013) (“The definition of ‘motivation crowding out’ in economic 
research includes any effect that is opposite to the relative price effect of standard economic 
theory: rewards decreasing behavior levels, and penalties increasing behavior levels.”). 
 9. See infra Part I.A–B. 
 10. Tor Helge Holmås et al., Does Monetary Punishment Crowd Out Pro-Social 
Motivation? A Natural Experiment on Hospital Length of Stay, 75 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 261, 
262 (2010). 
 11. See Brian Galle, The Tragedy of the Carrots: Economics and Politics in the Choice of Price 
Instruments, 64 STAN. L. REV. 797, 808 (2012) (“Society can use either carrots or sticks 
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actually identical. That is, a reward transfers wealth in one 
direction and a fine in the other.12 In addition, people’s psycho-
logical responses to rewards and sanctions are often different.13 
Although the tax-enforcement context typically focuses on fines 
rather than rewards, it is helpful to start with rewards because that 
literature is more developed. First, this Part briefly discusses 
rewards. It then turns to sanctions. 
A. Rewards 
There are three strands of literature outside of tax that are 
highly relevant to the hypothesis that rewards can reduce intrinsic 
motivation. The first strand of literature involves blood donation, 
the second is the psychology literature on intrinsic motivation for 
performing tasks, and the third is the economics literature on 
“motivation crowding out.” With respect to blood donation, 
Richard Titmuss’s 1970 book, The Gift Relationship, argued that 
(1) paying for blood donations decreases the donations’ quality 
because payment creates incentives for those with infectious 
diseases or drug addictions to conceal those conditions and 
(2) payment is economically inefficient.14 Titmuss’s inefficiency 
argument was that there is more wasted blood and higher 
administrative costs when donors are compensated.15 
 
interchangeably to get externality producers to ‘internalize’ the marginal effects of their deci-
sions on others. . . . These are equivalent . . . from the perspective of my single decision . . . 
because of opportunity costs.”). 
 12. See id. at 801 (“Relative to present policy, a carrot transfers wealth from taxpayers 
to its recipients, while sticks have the opposite effect.”). 
 13. Id. at 808–09 (citing JONATHAN BARON, THINKING AND DECIDING 269–70 (4th 
ed. 2007)). 
 14. See RICHARD M. TITMUSS, THE GIFT RELATIONSHIP 246 (1970) (referring to paid 
donations as resulting in wasted blood). Titmuss based his blood quality hypothesis on 
reports from American doctors to that effect, id. at 112–15, 117–18, contrasting that with the 
United Kingdom (U.K.), where virtually all blood donation was voluntary, id. at 89. 
 15. Id. at 246 (stating that the American system “is five to fifteen times more costly 
than the voluntary system in Britain”); see also Claudia Niza et al., Incentivizing Blood 
Donation: Systematic Review and Meta-Analysis to Test Titmuss’ Hypotheses, 32 HEALTH 
PSYCHOL. 941, 941 (2013). 
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Titmuss’s assertions were controversial16 and heavily studied 
empirically.17 Studies generally found that compensation had no 
effect on the quantity of blood donated18 or that payment increased 
donation,19 which is a price effect. The principal exception is that 
two studies found evidence of a crowding-out effect among female 
participants who were offered a small cash reward.20 
Independent of Titmuss’s work, a psychology literature devel-
oped hypothesizing that rewarding a behavior can undermine 
an individual’s intrinsic motivation to continue that behavior once 
the reward is removed.21 A classic example involves an experiment 
in which nursery school children who were promised and 
rewarded with an attractive certificate for drawing with markers in 
a first session spent less time drawing and drew less well in a 
second, unrewarded session than children who had not received a 
 
 16. Niza et al., supra note 15, at 941 (“[Titmuss’s] arguments raised a heated discus-
sion, particularly among economists, with criticism of Titmuss for his narrow view of market 
forces and lack of empirical support.”). 
 17. Several studies used meta-analysis, which allows data from studies on the same 
topic to be combined, effectively increasing the sample size. See Judy Cameron et al., 
Pervasive Negative Effects of Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation: The Myth Continues, 24 BEHAV. 
ANALYST, Spring 2001, at 1, 5. 
 18. Id. 
 19. See Nicola Lacetera et al., Economic Rewards to Motivate Blood Donations, 340 SCI. 
MAG. 927, 927 (2013) (“Observational studies that control for confounding factors have 
examined 14 incentive items ranging from small coupons to a paid day off work. All were 
found to increase blood donations.”); Christian Weidmann et al., Monetary Compensation and 
Blood Donor Return: Results of a Donor Survey in Southwest Germany, 41 TRANSFUSION MED. & 
HEMOTHERAPY 257, 257–58, 260 (2014) (finding in Southwest Germany that compensation 
increased the likelihood a donor would return during the first and second year after the first 
donation but had no statistically significant effect in the third year). 
 20. See Nicola Lacetera & Mario Macis, Do All Material Incentives for Pro-Social Activities 
Backfire? The Response to Cash and Non-Cash Incentives for Blood Donations, 31 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 
738, 740 (2010) (“[F]emale donors are almost twice as likely to declare that they would stop 
donating or donate less often [when offered cash] compared to male donors; the gender 
difference is much smaller for the in-kind payment, however.”); Carl Mellstrom & Magnus 
Johannesson, Crowding Out in Blood Donation: Was Titmuss Right?, 6 J. EUR. ECON. ASS’N. 845, 
847 (2008) (Swedish study finding that a $7 payment reduced the percentage of female 
subjects donating blood from 52% to 30%). 
 21. See Promberger & Marteau, supra note 8, at 950 (citing, as the start of that literature, 
Edward L. Deci, Effects of Externally Mediated Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 18 J. 
PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 105 (1971)); see also Bruno S. Frey & Reto Jegen, Motivation 
Crowding Theory, 15 J. ECON. SURVEYS 589, 589 (2001) (“The basic idea that rewards . . . may 
crowd out intrinsic motivation emanates from two quite different branches of literature in 
the social sciences.”). 
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certificate in the first session.22 One way to look at this is that 
compensation reframes something that used to be fun as work, 
leading the recipient to expect compensation for it in the future.23 
The idea that rewards might reduce desirable behavior was 
controversial in this context, too.24 A large literature developed that 
tested when rewards might have an undesirable effect.25 Compet-
ing meta-analyses reached different results with respect to whether 
a tangible reward for doing an interesting activity undermined or 
increased motivation.26 However, they generally found that a tan-
gible, expected reward given simply for performing a particular 
task—of which the certificate given to the children is an example—
had a negative effect on intrinsic motivation.27 
In 1997, Bruno Frey, citing the psychology literature, published 
an article that launched the economics literature on “motivation 
crowding out.”28 In that article, Frey argued: 
 When a work activity is supported by both high work morale 
and external intervention, a ‘psychologically’ unstable situation 
 
 22. Mark R. Lepper & David Greene, Undermining Children’s Intrinsic Interest with 
Extrinsic Reward: A Test of the “Overjustification” Hypothesis, 28 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. 
PSYCHOL. 129, 133–34 (1973). 
 23. DOUGLAS G. MOOK, CLASSIC EXPERIMENTS IN PSYCHOLOGY 172–74 (2004) (in 
chapter 28, “Lepper et al. on the Costs of a Reward”). 
 24. Edward L. Deci et al., A Meta-Analytic Review of Experiments Examining the Effects 
of Extrinsic Rewards on Intrinsic Motivation, 125 PSYCHOL. BULL. 627, 627 (1999) (“Although the 
ever-expanding field of research that began with exploration of the effects of extrinsic 
rewards on intrinsic motivation has moved in these numerous directions, the original finding 
of the undermining of intrinsic motivation by tangible extrinsic rewards has continued to be 
the focus of considerable controversy.”). 
 25. Id. at 627–28 (examining “motivational theories, attributional theories, and 
behavioral or cognitive-behavioral theories”). 
 26. Id. at 631–32 (describing four meta-analyses conducted by 1995); see also Cameron 
et al., supra note 17 (2001 meta-analysis). See supra note 17 for a brief description of  
meta-analysis. 
 27. See Cameron et al., supra note 17, at 15–16, 21 (finding small but statistically 
significant negative effect both for high-interest tasks and for tangible rewards overall); Judy 
Cameron & W. David Pierce, Reinforcement, Reward, and Intrinsic Motivation: A Meta-Analysis, 
64 REV. EDUC. RES. 363, 394 (1994) (finding the negative effect only for a tangible, expected 
reward given for the act of performing the task); Deci et al., supra note 24, at 631–32 (citing 
Rummel and Feinberg (1988); Wiersma (1992); and Tang & Hall (1995), all finding that 
rewards generally undermined intrinsic motivation); id. at 644 (finding that performance-
contingent rewards have a significantly negative effect on intrinsic motivation but not on 
self-reported interest in the task). 
 28. Bruno S. Frey, On the Relationship Between Intrinsic and Extrinsic Work Motivation, 
15 INT’L J. INDUS. ORG. 427, 429 (1997). 
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arises. The agent is ‘over motivated’ as she would do the work 
even if one (or both) motivations were reduced. A rational actor 
responds by reducing that motivation which is under her control, 
i.e. she lowers her intrinsic work motivation. Intrinsic motivation 
is partially or totally substituted by externally controlled extrinsic 
work motivation.29 
Frey argued that two conditions are required for motivation 
crowding out to occur: (1) the worker must be sufficiently intrin-
sically motivated at the outset and (2) conditions perceived as 
controlling the worker’s behavior must be present.30 Frey further 
argued that although rewards can crowd out intrinsic motivation, 
particularly where the reward is contingent on performance, 
workers “perceive rewards as less restrictive to their self-
determination than commands, which are felt to intrude directly 
into the agents’ realm of self-determination.”31 
Harvey James developed a model in which when a reward was 
sufficiently large, it overpowered the internal motivation of an 
intrinsically motivated individual by becoming so salient as to be 
perceived as a control mechanism.32 Frey summarized that 
“[e]xternal intervention crowds out intrinsic motivation if the 
individuals affected perceive the intervening individuals to be 
controlling. . . . External intervention crowds in intrinsic motivation 
if the individuals concerned perceive it as supportive (or 
informative in a positive way).”33 Other scholars have also found 
crowding out of extrinsic motivation in the work context.34 Frey 
 
 29. Id. at 430 (single quotation marks in the original). 
 30. Id. at 431–32. 
 31. Id. at 432. 
 32. Harvey S. James, Jr., Why Did You Do That? An Economic Examination of the Effect of 
Extrinsic Compensation on Intrinsic Motivation and Performance, 26 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 549, 563 
(2005) (“If total compensation is too large, then the salience of the extrinsic reward might be 
so overwhelming that the agent is rationally compelled to perceive the compensation as a 
mechanism of control, thus resulting in MCO [motivation crowding out].”). 
 33. Bruno Frey, Crowding Out and Crowding In of Intrinsic Preferences, in REFLEXIVE 
GOVERNANCE FOR GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS 78 (Eric Brousseau et al. eds., 2012) 
(emphasis altered). 
 34. See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Fairness and Retaliation: The Economics of 
Reciprocity, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 159, 168 (2000); Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, Pay Enough or 
Don’t Pay at All, 115 Q. J. ECON. 791, 793–94 (2000) (finding that college students got more 
questions correct when offered higher pay per correct answer, but students that paid a flat 
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and his coauthors have found a negative effect of rewards, 
consistent with crowding-out theory, in other contexts, too.35 For 
example, offering Swiss residents compensation to have a nuclear 
waste repository near them decreased the percentage who were 
willing to have the facility there.36 
These literatures may be applicable in other contexts, as well. 
For example, Marianne Promberger and Theresa M. Marteau 
examined the experiments in the psychology and economic 
literatures to determine when they might “predict[] financial 
incentives to crowd out motivation for health-related behaviors.”37 
In so doing, they reported the main findings of the psychology 
literature as follows: “Tangible, expected rewards reduce behavior 
for interesting tasks (where behavior is initially high). No reduced 
persistence in task for previously dull tasks (where little time is 
initially spent on task).”38 They also noted that the economics 
literature finds that increasing the size of an incentive usually has a 
price effect, meaning that a greater reward produces more of the 
rewarded activity.39 
With respect to tax, at least one scholar has proposed rewarding 
tax compliance.40 However, tax authorities generally do not use 
rewards for compliance, focusing instead on sanctions for 
noncompliance. Some countries use lotteries to foster tax 
 
fee for participating got more questions correct than the students offered the lowest fee per 
correct answer). 
 35. Iris Bohnet et al., More Order with Less Law: On Contract Enforcement, Trust, and 
Crowding, 95 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 131, 132 (2001) (paper coauthored with Frey, finding in a 
model of contract formation that trust is crowded in with weak enforcement and crowded 
out with moderate enforcement). 
 36. Frey & Oberholzer-Gee, supra note 7, at 749 (finding that 50.8% of those surveyed 
agreed when not offered compensation but that only 24.6% agreed once offered 
compensation). The significance level is not reported. See id. 
 37. Promberger & Marteau, supra note 8, at 950. 
 38. Id. at 951 tbl.1. They also noted that the psychology literature looks at tasks the 
subject is intrinsically motivated to do, gives one group a reward for doing the task, and 
compares subjects’ persistence at the task after removal of the reward. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. See Joshua D. Rosenberg, The Psychology of Taxes: Why They Drive Us Crazy, and How 
We Can Make Them Sane, 16 VA. TAX REV. 155, 220–21 (1996) (discussing the benefits of 
reducing tax liability as a reward for disclosing transactions that would be difficult to deter 
otherwise); cf. Sarah B. Lawsky, Fairly Random: On Compensating Audited Taxpayers, 41 CONN. 
L. REV. 161 (2008) (discussing the possibility of compensating individuals subject to 
random audits). 
 
003.LEDERMAN_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/19  7:43 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2018 
632 
compliance, but the lottery participants are consumers who send in 
their receipts, while the target of the enforcement is merchants.41 
There are few studies of what effects rewards would have in the 
context of tax compliance, which presumably is not a “high-interest 
task.” However, a recent field study in Germany included a 
reward intervention.42 
The German study, by Dwenger et al., involves a small church 
tax. The authors explain that “the church tax is compulsory and 
noncompliance represents a violation of tax law, but the church 
highlights the good cause and encourages overpayments that are 
defined as donations.”43 Moreover, the base for the tax is the 
taxpayer’s taxable income as reported to the government, making 
compliance easily verifiable, although the law was not enforced 
prior to the study.44 
Dwenger et al. found that, before their intervention, 20.9% of 
the 40,000 Protestant-church-member taxpayers in their sample 
had paid at least the full amount of tax due—with 55.5% of those 
who paid paying precisely the amount due and the remaining 
79.1% evading, with 91.9% of the evaders paying nothing.45 
Dwenger et al. then assigned these taxpayers randomly to one of 
twelve treatments or the control group.46 Unlike the studies 
discussed above, where the reward was offered to 100% of those 
eligible, the reward in the church tax study was being entered into 
 
 41. See Nirmal Sandhu, A Lottery Lesson from Thailand, TRIB. (India) (May 19, 2003), 
http://www.tribuneindia.com/2003/20030519/biz.htm#2 (“The government in Thailand 
now offers a handsome prize of $7,000 each week to 11 winners, who scribble their names 
on the back of the receipts and send them to the Finance Ministry.”); see also WORLD BANK, 
WORLD DEVELOPMENT REPORT 2005: A BETTER INVESTMENT CLIMATE FOR EVERYONE 110 
(2005), http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWDR2005/Resources/complete_report.pdf 
(describing a similar program in China). 
 42. See Nadja Dwenger et al., Extrinsic and Intrinsic Motivations for Tax Compliance: 
Evidence from a Field Experiment in Germany, 8 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL’Y 203, 205 (2016). 
 43. Id. at 204. Most adults do not regularly attend church but remain members. Id. at 
207 (“[B]etween 0.8% and 8.8% of eligible church members regularly attend church services 
in our sample parishes.”). Adults can avoid tax liability by leaving the church. See Justin 
Huggler, Compulsory Income Tax on Christians Drives Germans Away from Protestant and 
Catholic Churches, TELEGRAPH (Jan. 30, 2015), http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/world 
news/europe/germany/11380968/Compulsory-income-tax-on-Christians-drives-Germans 
-away-from-Protestant-and-Catholic-churches.html. 
 44. Dwenger et al., supra note 42, at 204. 
 45. Id. at 216. 
 46. Id. at 205. 
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a lottery for a monetary prize, a small probability of being 
recognized in a local newspaper for tax compliance, or both.47 
Dwenger et al. found that the prospect of a reward or recognition 
had no significant effect on donors’ likelihood of donating but did 
significantly positively affect the likelihood that they increase their 
donation.48 However, the reward/recognition intervention had a 
negative effect on baseline evaders, who statistically significantly 
both (1) increased their likelihood of evading (by 1.27%) and 
(2) reduced the likelihood they increase the amount paid (by 
nearly 16%).49 
B. Punishment 
Turning to sanctions, which are much more widely used than 
rewards in the tax context, an argument that Bruno Frey has 
advanced in several articles is that deterrence can crowd out “tax 
morale”—the intrinsic motivation to comply50—as discussed 
further below.51 For example Frey argues: 
To some extent, paying one’s taxes is a “quasi-voluntary” 
act attributable to an intrinsic motivation to contribute to the 
burden of taxation. . . . An unfair, inconsiderate way of treating 
taxpayers—punishing honest taxpayers by error—tends to 
undermine this tax morale. The net effect of using punishment in 
an effort to establish legal behavior is counterproductive if the 
 
 47. Id. at 213 (“For all these compliance rewards, the probability of winning the reward 
is close to zero . . . ; for the monetary reward treatment the notification makes explicit that 
the probability of winning is 1/1,000.”). 
 48. Id. at 227. There was a 48.34% probability of an increased donation, which was 
statistically significant at p < 0.10. See id. at 221 tbl.2 (reporting coefficients and robust 
standard errors). P-value is the likelihood a finding is by chance, with p < 0.10 denoting a 
likelihood under 10%. See Jonathan J. Darrow, Pharmaceutical Efficacy: The Illusory Legal 
Standard, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2073, 2113 (2013). “By convention, a p-value calculated to 
be 5% or less (p=0.05) is considered to be ‘statistically significant,’ but other p-values could 
also be used.” Id. (footnote omitted). 
 49. See Dwenger et al., supra note 42, 227. These were statistically significant at p < 0.10 
and p < 0.05, respectively. See id. at 221 tbl.2. 
 50. Bruno S. Frey, Deterrence and Tax Morale in the European Union, 11 EUR. REV. 385, 
391 (2003). 
 51. See infra Part II.A. 
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relative price effect of the punishment is smaller than the 
crowding-out effect.52 
Thus, it is important to examine the extent to which punishment 
may have the perverse effect of increasing noncompliant behavior. 
There are several studies examining this possibility in non-tax 
contexts. For example, a laboratory study by Ernst Fehr and Simon 
Gächter found a crowding-out effect of fines in a work context, 
where an “employer” could offer a “worker” a “wage” and “effort 
level.”53 In the study, the employer could impose a fine if he or she 
found the worker shirking; the worker faced a one-third chance that 
effort-level would be checked.54 The study found that except at low 
“rent” levels (defined as wages minus the cost of the worker’s 
effort), the fine treatment reduced effort levels compared to the 
baseline (no-fine) control—a crowding-out effect.55  
Perhaps the most well-known field experiment finding that 
sanctions increase undesired behavior56 is “A Fine Is a Price,” by 
Uri Gneezy and Aldo Rustichini, involving a study of Israeli day-
care centers.57 The authors had the day-care centers introduce a 
fine of ten New Israeli Shekels (NIS) per child for each instance 
where a parent was ten or more minutes late picking up a child.58 
 
 52. Bruno S. Frey, Punishment—and Beyond, 5 CONTEMP. ECON. 90, 92 (2011) 
(citation omitted). 
 53. Fehr & Gächter, supra note 34, at 168, 170–71. 
 54. Id. at 170. 
 55. Id. at 170–71. The statistical significance is not reported there. See id. In addition, 
the article does not explore whether the result is driven by workers who were not themselves 
sanctioned, workers who were, or both. This remains unclear in a related, unpublished 
article. See Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Do Incentive Contracts Crowd Out Voluntary 
Cooperation? 12–17 & tbl.3 (Univ. of S. Cal. Ctr. for Law, Econ. & Org., Research Paper No. 
C01-3, Feb. 2001), https://ssrn.com/abstract=229047. Studies in the tax context suggest that 
experiencing the sanction may affect behavior. See infra Part III. Subsequent experiments by 
Fehr & Gächter “indicate that a significant part of the undermining effect is due to the 
negative framing of the explicit incentive.” Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Do Incentive 
Contracts Undermine Voluntary Cooperation? 1 (Inst. for Empirical Research in Econ., Univ. of 
Zurich, Working Paper No. 34, Apr. 2002). 
 56. See Ariel Rubinstein, Discussion of “Behavioral Economics,” in 3 ADVANCES IN 
ECONOMICS AND ECONOMETRICS: THEORY AND APPLICATIONS, NINTH WORLD CONGRESS 250 
(Richard Blunell et al. eds., 2006) (“The behavioral economics literature has wholeheartedly 
adopted the paper.”). 
 57. Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, A Fine Is a Price, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1 (2000). 
 58. Based on the authors’ conversion of NIS 1400 to $380, see infra text accompanying 
note 71, NIS 10 would be approximately $2.71. 
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The fine was due at the end of the month, with the parents’ regular 
bill.59 The study found that the lateness incidence not only 
increased,60 the increased frequency of lateness persisted after the 
fine was removed.61 
Uri Gneezy, Stephan Meier, and Pedro Rey-Biel later explained 
the result: 
One interpretation of this result is information: the parents did not 
initially know how important it was to arrive on time. The 
contract specified that they should pick their children up on time 
but failed to specify the penalty if they did not. The distribution 
of the parents’ beliefs regarding how bad it was to be late may 
have included bad scenarios (for example, “the teacher will make 
my child suffer”). Once a small fine was imposed, the contract was 
complete in that being late was priced. The relatively small fine 
signaled to parents that arriving late was not that important. This 
new piece of information—that it was not so bad to be late—did 
not disappear once the fine was removed.62 
Ariel Rubinstein critiqued the day-care center study63 because 
his experience in Israel—that rules are rarely enforced and lateness 
is easily excused—made it difficult for him to believe that the 
 
 59. Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 57, at 5 (“Payment was made to the principal of 
the day-care center at the end of the month. Since monthly payments are made to the owner 
during the year, the fines were added to those amounts.”). 
 60. Id. at 3, 7 fig.1. The authors contrasted blocks of four weeks each. They found no 
time trend in the control group, but the difference between Block 1 (before the fine was 
introduced in the treatment group) and each of the other fine-condition blocks was 
significant at p < 0.001. See id. at 17 app. B. 
 61. Id. at 3, 8. The authors apparently did not examine whether parents who were late 
in a particular week had been fined in the previous week (or at all). See Uri Gneezy & Aldo 
Rustichini, The Second Day-Care Center Study (2005), http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/papers 
/WC05/GR1.pdf (explaining that the study reflected “only the average data per daycare per 
week,” not “individual parent data”). 
 62. Gneezy et al., When and Why Incentives (Don’t) Work to Modify Behavior, 25 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 191, 194 (2011) (emphasis added). Of course, schools have limited legitimate means to 
make children suffer (and for good reason). However, they are not obligated to reward 
children who are picked up late. A friend who taught at a K–12 school said that to deter 
parental lateness, the teachers would have the children ready on time, sitting and waiting in 
their coats. That way, a late parent would experience a bored child. 
 63. See Uri Gneezy & Aldo Rustichini, Reply to Ariel Rubinstein’s Critique of “A Fine Is a 
Price” (2005), http://arielrubinstein.tau.ac.il/papers/WC05/GR.pdf (responding to discus-
sant remarks at the World Congress of the Econometric Society); Rubinstein, supra note 56 
(published proceedings of that World Congress). 
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procedures the study reported were actually followed.64 Rubinstein 
observed that the authors did not verify the reports of the research 
assistant who asked the assistant teacher each week who had been 
late the previous week. Rubinstein also stated that he was not 
permitted to talk to the teachers. He adds that one of the coauthors 
of the day-care center article “agreed that he should delay 
publication until a new experiment with better monitoring of data 
collection is conducted. Eventually, the paper was published 
as is.”65 
Gneezy and Rustichini responded to Rubinstein that (1) they 
did not create the fine of NIS 10, the day-care centers’ central 
organization provided that option; (2) it is common practice for 
managers in the day-care centers to record which parents were late; 
and (3) neither the managers nor the research assistants knew the 
authors’ hypothesis. They also stated that they offered to allow 
Rubinstein to participate in a follow-up study, but he declined.66 
Gneezy and Rustichini did release a follow-up paper, and it 
reports the same general results.67 “The Second Day-Care Center 
Study” is dated September 2005, but it appears preliminary; it 
contains three pages and concludes by stating that “[a] more 
detailed analysis of the data and the result is in preparation.”68 This 
paper states that the authors received approval from the managers 
of the day-care centers for Rubinstein to call them. However, 
Rubinstein states, “Although the authors report that they are still 
working on the data and that they have asked the teachers for 
permission to be interviewed by me, the author who directed the 
 
 64. Rubinstein, supra note 56, at 250. He also found it “impossible . . . to imagine that 
Israeli teachers would have kept even roughly accurate records of late arrivals” in the bustle 
of pick-up. Id. 
 65. Id. Gneezy and Rustichini explained that Rubinstein “advised us to withdraw the 
paper from the Journal of Legal Studies before the publication. Since we were fully convinced 
that the design, the method, the data collection and the result were sound . . . , we eventually 
declined to follow his advice.” Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 63. 
 66. Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 63. 
 67. See Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 61, at 3. The results are statistically significant 
at p < 0.00001. Id. 
 68. See id. Although the study states that “in the new study we also collected the 
individual parent data,” disaggregated results are not reported. 
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experiment has just informed me that he has lost the names of the 
kindergarten teachers who participated in the experiment.”69 
If we assume that Gneezy and Rustichini’s data are accurate 
despite Rubinstein’s critiques, what do their results show? First, it 
is important to observe that the NIS 10 fine in the day-care center 
was very low.70 Gneezy and Rustichini reported that babysitters 
earned NIS 15 to 20 per hour and the monthly per-child day-care 
fee was NIS 1400 (approximately $380).71 Thus, the fine was only 
half to two-thirds of an hour of babysitter care, and without having 
to arrange for a babysitter. Second, other factors that may be 
relevant to the ability to generalize from this study include the fact 
that the study involves individuals and not firms; the fine applied 
in every instance of wrongdoing;72 the specific context of the study, 
involving parental lateness in picking up children from day care; 
and even local culture.73 
We also do not know whether a particular subgroup of parents 
is driving this result. That is, did all parents react similarly to the 
 
 69. Rubinstein, supra note 56, at 251. 
 70. See Leandra Lederman, The Interplay Between Norms and Enforcement in Tax 
Compliance, 64 OHIO ST. L.J. 1453, 1461 n.38 (2003) (noting how low the fine was); Stephan 
Meier & Matthew Stephenson, When Do Monetary Incentives Backfire?, HARV. ECON. REV. 
(Apr. 13, 2016), http://harvardecon.org/?p=3283 (“The evidence from the daycare (and 
elsewhere) showed that incentives did not always work as intended. Of course, if the 
incentives are large enough they likely will . . . .”). 
 Lin and Yang developed a theoretical model to explain Gneezy and Rustichini’s results. 
See Chung-cheng Lin & C.C. Yang, Fine Enough or Don’t Fine at All, 59 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 
195 (2006). In their model, there is a social norm of being on time rather than late. Id. at 197. 
Once a fine is introduced, the psychological cost of violating the social norm decreases, 
reducing the effectiveness of the social norm. In addition, because the psychological cost of 
lateness is affected by how many other parents are late, there is a “bandwagon effect” that 
further increases the number of parents arriving late. Id. at 205. This results in a new norm 
that makes lateness more acceptable, such that when the fine is removed, parental lateness 
does not return to the pre-fine level. Id. at 206. Lin and Yang’s model therefore counsels 
setting any fines used high enough to be effective. 
 71. Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 57, at 4–5. 
 72. See Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 67, at 1 (“One of the coauthors interviewed 
some parents at random and was told that the fine was indeed collected at the end of 
the month.”). 
 73. Barak Ariel found that deterrence letters had no effect on Israeli corporate 
taxpayers, and moral suasion letters actually increased their noncompliance. See Barak Ariel, 
Deterrence and Moral Persuasion Effects on Corporate Tax Compliance: Findings from a Randomized 
Controlled Trial, 50 AM. J. CRIM. 27, 41–45, 58 (2012). Other studies have found audit threat 
letters to increase tax payments, see infra Part II.B.1, and that moral suasion letters have no 
effect or a slight positive one, see infra note 163. 
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imposition of the fine, or did those who were actually fined (or not 
fined) increase the frequency of their lateness? In other words, how 
did the effects on those experiencing an enforcement action differ 
from regime-level effects? In the original study, Gneezy and 
Rustichini “had only the average data per daycare per week,”74 
which would preclude that analysis. In “The Second Day-Care 
Center Study,” they “collected the individual parent data,”75 but 
they do not report separate results for parents who were fined from 
those who were not fined (or not fined for a while).76 
Given both Rubinstein’s critique and the lack of detail in “The 
Second Day-Care Center Study,” a logical next question is whether 
Gneezy and Rustichini’s result exists in other contexts. There are 
few comparable studies. However, a 2010 study in Norway took 
advantage of a natural experiment in another lateness context, so-
called “bed blocking.” That study examined whether fines imposed 
by hospitals on the owners of long-term care facilities (munici-
palities) for not having a bed available for a hospital patient 
transferring to long-term care affect the likelihood patients over age 
sixty-seven will stay in the hospital after their planned discharge 
date.77 Hospitals can impose these fines on the long-term care 
facility’s owners if the patient is in the hospital ten days after the 
hospital’s stated discharge date (seven days in Oslo).78 
 
 74. Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 67, at 1. 
 75. Id. 
 76. In “The Second Day-Care Center Study,” the authors distinguish between “three 
periods, a first of four weeks, a second of 11 weeks (from the 5th to the 15th) and a final third 
period, weeks 16th to 18th.” Id. They introduced the fine at the beginning of the fourth 
week—part way through the first period—and removed it at the beginning of the sixteenth 
week. Id. They report that “[i]n the centers where fines were introduced, the increase in the 
number of delays is higher in the families with higher delays in the first period.” Id. This 
could be a function of a lateness-prone effect, see infra note 95 and accompanying text, or it 
could suggest that those fined responded with greater delays. However, without more 
details, it is impossible to know, as the first period includes three weeks without fines and 
one week after fining began. 
 It is also unclear if any of the ten day-care centers studied (six treated and four control, 
Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 67, at 1) had been treated with the fine condition in the 
previous study and, if so, whether some of the same parents were still using that center. 
 77. Holmås et al., supra note 10, at 262, 263 (“[W]e . . . restrict our sample to individuals 
older than 67 who are discharged from hospital to a long-term care institution. For these 
patients, it is quite clear that the hospital [length of stay] is directly influenced by the 
municipalities since they cannot be discharged from the hospital before an institution 
accepts . . . them.”). 
 78. Id. at 262. 
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The study examined two large hospitals, one that used fines 
and one that did not. A “natural experiment took place in 2004, 
where parts of Hospital F’s [the Fine hospital’s] catchment area 
were transferred [by the government] to Hospital NF [the No-Fine 
hospital], while parts of Hospital NF’s catchment area were 
transferred to Hospital F.”79 Thus, some municipalities stayed in 
the fine (or no-fine) area before and after 2004, and some moved 
from fine to no-fine status (or the reverse) in 2004.80 
The study’s results were consistent with crowding-out theory: 
“Patients living in municipalities that change[d] hospital[s] from F 
to NF stay[ed] approximately 2.3 days shorter at hospital after their 
potential discharge date, while patients changing from NF to F 
stay[ed] close to 3 days longer.”81 They found that the effects were 
symmetric: delays increased when the fine was introduced and 
decreased when the fine was removed (unlike in the day-care 
center study).82 They also explained that “the daily penalty rate [of 
1600 Norwegian Krone (NOK)/day; 2000 in Oslo83] is . . . well 
below the estimated average daily operation cost of 7[000]–8[]000 
NOK in Norwegian hospitals and can therefore be characterised as 
a relatively small fine.”84 
Thus, these field experiments suggest that a low fine may be 
viewed as a (favorable) price, such that, at least in the context of 
lateness, the fined behavior actually increases. A low fine may also 
signal that the fined behavior is not so bad.85 Yet a low price may 
 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 262–63. 
 81. Id. at 265. This was statistically significant at p < 0.01. Id. at 265 tbl.5. 
 82. Id. at 266. They note that “in the daycare study it was the same agents (parents) 
that had the fine introduced and then subsequently removed, while in our study some agents 
had the fine introduced while others had the fine removed.” Id. It is unclear whether length 
of delay changed immediately after the fine was introduced/removed, or not until the 
hospitals actually experienced the change. See generally id. 
 83. At the October 2018 exchange rate of 1 NOK = $0.12 (rounded to the nearest cent), 
1600 NOK is $192.00. See XE Currency Converter, XE, http://www.xe.com/currencyconvert 
er/convert/?Amount= 1&From= NOK&To=USD (last visited Oct. 18, 2018). 
 84. Holmås et al., supra note 10, at 266 (citation omitted). 
 85. Some U.S. day-care centers report using late fees that increase as lateness rises 
(such as $1 per minute per child) and/or increase with repeated lateness. See Please Give Me 
Your Late Pick Up Policy, DAYCARE.COM, http://www.daycare.com/forum/archive/index. 
php/t-21692.html (Daycare.com Forum > Main Category > Daycare Center and Family 
Home Forum > Please Give Me Your Late Pick Up Policy) (last visited Oct. 18, 2018). 
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not necessarily increase undesired behavior in all contexts. Lior 
Strahilevitz’s article on the commodification of California carpool 
lanes presents an interesting example. San Diego was having a 
problem with traffic congestion.86 HOV (high-occupancy vehicle) 
lanes were not incentivizing carpooling enough.87 In addition, 
approximately 15% of drivers using the HOV lanes were solo 
drivers violating the law and risking a $271 fine.88 
San Diego then instituted an “ExpressPass” option that allowed 
solo drivers to pay a small amount89 to use the HOV lanes (renamed 
HOT lanes—presumably meaning “High Occupancy Toll”90). It 
also increased patrolling for violators from once a month to three 
times per week.91 The changes had two effects, both positive: 
unauthorized use of the special lanes decreased92 and car- 
pooling increased.93 
This outcome is not necessarily inconsistent with the negative 
results small fines had in other studies because, unlike in the other 
studies, the baseline included a large fine for violations ($271 in 
1996 dollars, equivalent to $433 in 201894). The main intervention 
was the addition of a comparatively small per-use price, although 
patrolling also increased—akin to increasing the audit rate.95 The 
 
 86. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, How Changes in Property Regimes Influence Social Norms: 
Commodifying California’s Carpool Lanes, 75 IND. L.J. 1231, 1250 (2000). 
 87. Id. (“Although a vehicle needed only two occupants in order to constitute a 
carpool, the HOV lanes tended to be underutilized.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 88. Id. at 1256; see also id. at 1257 n.141. 
 89. A toll amount is displayed at the entrance to the HOT lanes, and it rises with the 
volume of traffic in the HOT lanes. Tolls averaged $1.95 to $2.26 in 1998. Id. at 1251 & n.111. 
In 2000, the tolls ranged from $0.50 to $8.00 per trip but only exceeded $4.00 in the event of 
extreme congestion. Id. at 1252 n.111. 
 90. Id. at 1251 n.108. 
 91. Id. at 1257 n.143. 
 92. Id. at 1256 (reporting that HOV violations decreased from about 15% of drivers in 
the HOV lanes to approximately 3% of drivers in the HOT lanes). 
 93. Id. at 1234. Data suggested that “the new carpools consisted mostly of drivers who 
had neither used an ExpressPass nor participated in a carpool during the previous year.” Id. 
at 1256. It is not clear from the article what percentage of these drivers had previously 
been fined. 
 94. Inflation Calculator, SMART ASSET, https://smartasset.com/investing/inflation-cal 
culator#uEsf3XMVYx (last visited Oct. 18, 2018). 
 95. Strahilevitz argues that the increased patrolling does not explain the entire 
increase in compliance. He states that compliance did not fully correspond to enforcement 
because there was at least one month of relatively low enforcement/high compliance and 
one of high enforcement/lower compliance. Strahilevitz, supra note 86, at 1258–59. However, 
drivers cannot perfectly observe enforcement, and they may also respond with a lag, such as 
by increasing compliance the month after they perceive a “crackdown.” 
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intervention increased traffic in the special lanes, perhaps 
analogous to the increased instances of lateness once the Israeli 
day-care centers imposed a small fine, although, in the HOT lanes 
context, the increase was desired. The HOT lanes also increased 
carpooling, which would be analogous in the day-care center study 
to a small minority of parents increasing their commitment to being 
on time, so as to avoid paying the fine. 
This raises the question of whether the increased instances of 
lateness once the day-care centers imposed fines were by many 
different parents (generally supporting a change in the lateness 
norms) or instead were by a “lateness-prone” subgroup, which 
would suggest that some parents might—like San Diego 
carpoolers—feel that their responsible behavior was now 
quantifiable in money savings. And, in fact, Gneezy and Rustichini 
report in their second study: 
[F]amilies who are more likely to be late in the first period are also 
more likely to be late in the second and third: this is true in the 
non fined centers as well. In the centers where fines were 
introduced, the increase in the number of delays is higher in the 
families with higher delays in the first period.96 
Thus, results reported in “The Second Day-Care Center Study” 
support the notion that a subgroup of people—here, those prone to 
be late—drive much of the result.  
Nonetheless, it is hard to draw firm conclusions from so few 
studies. That is not only because of the questions Rubinstein has 
raised about the Israeli day-care center study,97 but also because 
“one must recognize that many novel and surprising experimental 
results might not be robust—not because of falsification or 
something egregious, but merely due to the mechanics of the 
problem.”98 As Zacharias Maniadis et al. explain, “[t]he common 
reliance on statistical significance as the sole criterion leads to an 
 
 96. Gneezy & Rustichini, supra note 61, at 3. This result is analogous to a Dutch study 
that found that taxpayers evading in one year were more likely to do so in a later year. See 
infra note 408 and accompanying text. 
 97. See supra text accompanying notes 63–69. 
 98. See Zacharias Maniadis et al., One Swallow Doesn’t Make a Summer: New Evidence on 
Anchoring Effects, 104 AM. ECON. REV. 277, 278 (2014) (“[O]ur theoretical model suggests that 
many surprising new empirical results are likely not recovering true associations.”). 
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excessive number of false positives”99 because “the statistical power 
of the test and the fraction of tested hypotheses that are true 
associations” also matter.100 A bias toward publication of surprising 
or unexpected results exacerbates the problem.101 
Moreover, in addition to the small number of studies, the day-
care center and hospital studies are non-tax studies, so they do not 
bear directly on the question of whether sanctions crowd out 
taxpayers’ intrinsic motivation to pay taxes. The next Part discusses 
this theory and argues that, in the tax context, the evidence from 
empirical studies suggests that deterrence generally is effective. 
II. DETERRENCE AS A TOOL FOR FOSTERING TAX COMPLIANCE 
Noncompliance with a tax saves that taxpayer money, at least 
up front, but it carries risks. The government imposing the tax 
typically audits taxpayers and imposes penalties for detected 
noncompliance.102 Accordingly, economic models of tax 
compliance generally consider tax evasion a decision under 
uncertainty.103 The basic idea is that the existence of a penalty for 
noncompliance deters tax evasion but only in light of the 
probability that a penalty will actually be imposed. For example, a 
taxpayer who omits from income an amount resulting in 
understated tax of $1000 and who faces a 1% chance of audit that 
will detect the evasion and a 20% penalty in addition to the tax if 
detected ($1200 in total)104 faces an “expected” (probabilistic) cost 
of $12. 
 
 99. Id. at 288. 
 100. Id. 
 101. Id. 
 102. See I.R.C. § 6662(a), (b) (2012) (imposing a 20% penalty for such things as negli-
gence or substantial understatement of tax); § 6663(a) (“If any part of any underpayment of 
tax required to be shown on a return is due to fraud, there shall be added to the tax an amount 
equal to 75 percent of the portion of the underpayment which is attributable to fraud.”). 
When penalties are imposed, taxpayers likely experience the resulting tax bill, which will 
include interest, as high. See Lederman, supra note 70, at 1466 & n.67. 
 103. See, e.g., Michael G. Allingham & Agnar Sandmo, Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical 
Analysis, 3 J. PUB. ECON. 323, 323–26 (1972); T.N. Srinivasan, Tax Evasion: A Model, 2 J. PUB. 
ECON. 339, 340 (1973). 
 104. These are realistic figures. See infra note 108 (official IRS audit rate for individuals 
is just under 1%); supra note 102 (20% penalty). 
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This very basic model has a number of simplifying 
assumptions. It assumes that taxpayers know the odds of detection 
and sanction levels and that they are risk-neutral. However, 
individuals may overestimate the likelihood that noncompliance 
will be detected and fined, which would tend to increase 
compliance by raising the expected cost of cheating. Corporate 
taxpayers are more likely to have sophisticated tax advisors who 
know the odds. Individuals are also less likely to be risk-neutral 
than corporate taxpayers.105 Risk aversion would tend to 
increase compliance.106 
A. The False Puzzle and “Tax Morale” 
Even if we were to assume that all audits detect all non-
compliance and result in the imposition of a penalty—which is not 
true—federal income tax penalties may be too low in light of 
existing audit rates (and vice versa) to make compliance the wealth-
maximizing choice. That is, penalties are a fraction (in the United 
States, typically 20%) of understated tax.107 The IRS reports audit 
rates for U.S. individuals of under 1%,108 making the expected value 
 
 105. See Joel Slemrod, The Economics of Corporate Tax Selfishness, 57 NAT’L TAX J. 877, 882 
(2004) (“[T]he assumption of risk aversion seems unsatisfactory for a large publicly-held 
firm, because presumably the shareholders hold diversified portfolios, implying that the firm 
should behave as if it is risk-neutral, even if its shareholders are not.”). 
 106. See, e.g., Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 103, at 329 (“We can then conclude that 
when actual income varies, the fraction declared increases, stays constant or decreases 
according [sic] as relative risk aversion is an increasing, constant or decreasing function of 
income.”); Paul J. Beck & Woon-Oh Jung, Taxpayer Compliance Under Uncertainty, 8 J. ACCT. 
& PUB. POL’Y 1, 18 (1989) (“Risk-averse taxpayers were shown to have incentives to increase 
their reported income (compliance) as the tax rate increases when penalties were propor-
tional to the amount of underpaid taxes.”). 
 107. See supra note 102. 
 108. See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SVC., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE 
DATA BOOK, 2015, at 23 (Mar. 2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/15databk.pdf 
(reporting that 0.8% of individual tax returns and 1.3% of corporate returns were examined 
for fiscal year (FY) 2015); DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SVC., INTERNAL 
REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK, 2014, at 26 (Mar. 2015), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs 
-soi/14databk.pdf (reporting that 0.9% of individual tax returns and 1.3% of corporate 
returns were examined for FY 2014). These are official IRS audit rates. The National Taxpayer 
Advocate has explained that the IRS makes additional “compliance contacts with taxpayers 
that it does not consider to be ‘real’ audits. These types of contacts . . . include math error 
corrections, Automated Underreporter (AUR) (a document matching program), identity and 
wage verification, and Automated Substitute for Return (ASFR) (a non-filer program).” NTA 
Blog: “Real” vs. “Unreal” Audits and Why This Distinction Matters, TAXPAYER ADVOC. SERV. 
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of any penalty less than 1% of its nominal value, even assuming 
that audits detect all cheating and always result in the imposition 
of a penalty.109 
So, in the example above, the expected cost of cheating was 
$12.110 By contrast, the cost of compliance was the full $1000 tax. For 
the expected cost of cheating to equal the cost of compliance, “an 
audit rate of 1% would require a $99,000 penalty in this example.”111 
Given these low levels of audit rates and penalties, it seems that a 
rational wealth-maximizing taxpayer should cheat whenever 
possible. Thus, at first cut, the basic economic model would seem 
to predict that no one pays any taxes.112 Yet the IRS estimates an 
overall voluntary compliance rate with U.S. federal taxes of almost 
82% of dollars due.113 
Many scholars have relied on this type of contrast to argue that 
deterrence does not explain tax compliance.114 They argue that the 
 
(July 6, 2018), https://taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/news/nta-blog-real-vs-unreal-audits-and-
why-this-distinction-matters. “When adding these ‘unreal’ audit numbers to the ‘real’ ones, 
the IRS’s combined coverage rate jumps to over six percent.” Id. An audit rate of 6% would 
make the expected cost of cheating a still low $72 (6% of $1200). 
 Taxpayers are selected for audit in various ways. See supra note 2. The IRS’s whistle-
blower program plays a small part in that process. IRS, IRS WHISTLEBLOWER PROGRAM 
FISCAL YEAR 2016 ANNUAL REPORT TO THE CONGRESS 10 tbl.1, https://www.irs.gov/pub 
/whistleblower/fy16_wo_annual_report_final.pdf (reporting that 240 claims were made in 
2014, 204 in 2015, and 761 in 2016). 
 109. Even if a taxpayer erroneously believed that the audit rate is (a grossly inflated) 
30% and the penalty rate is 50%, for example, while that would increase the expected cost of 
cheating to $450 in the example (30% of $1500), it remains lower than the $1000 cost 
of compliance. 
 110. That is, 1% of $1200. See supra text accompanying note 104. If the taxpayer’s be-
havior meets the burden of proof for fraud, the taxpayer would owe $1750 (the $1000 plus a 
75% penalty). At a 1% audit rate, the expected value of the penalty is only $17.50. 
 111. Lederman, supra note 70, at 1465 (footnotes omitted). 
 112. See Dick J. Hessing et al., Does Deterrence Deter? Measuring the Effect of Deterrence 
on Tax Compliance in Field Studies and Experimental Studies, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES 291, 293 
(Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (“Given the current mild sanctions and low probability of detection, 
this kind of [economics] approach would predict that virtually everyone should be 
evading tax . . . .”). 
 113. See INTERNAL REVENUE SVC., TAX GAP ESTIMATES FOR TAX YEARS 2008–2010, at 3 
(Apr. 2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/tax%20gap%20estimates%20for%20200 
8%20through%202010.pdf (overall 81.7% voluntary compliance rate). 
 114. Dan M. Kahan, Signaling or Reciprocating? A Response to Eric Posner’s Law and Social 
Norms, 36 U. RICH. L. REV. 367, 377 (2002) (“Tax compliance rates—which vary dramatically 
across nations—seem to bear no connection to enforcement levels.”); see, e.g., James Alm et 
al., Economic and Noneconomic Factors in Tax Compliance, 48 KYKLOS 3, 3 (1995) (“[T]he real 
puzzle [of tax compliance] is ‘Why is there so little cheating?’”) (emphasis removed); cf. Eric 
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high level of voluntary compliance is a puzzle that the economic 
model cannot explain.115 For example, Bruno Frey has claimed: 
 Empirical research has convincingly established that it is 
impossible to account for the extent of tax paying by only 
considering the expected punishment. The crucial question is not 
why people do not pay their taxes, but rather “Why is there so 
little cheating?” To some extent, paying one’s taxes is a “quasi-
voluntary” act attributable to an intrinsic motivation to contribute 
to the burden of taxation. Risk aversion is not able to account for 
the extent of taxes paid in the United States and Switzerland.116 
Although Frey does not fully reject the deterrence model, he 
argues that it is inapplicable in some countries where, instead, “tax 
morale” is what prompts compliance.117 Although tax morale 
generally means simply an intrinsic compliance motivation,118 Frey 
sources it in “participatory governments” that have “(semi-) direct 
democracies, in which the citizens have initiative and referendum 
rights.”119 He points to California, Oregon, and Switzerland, and 
states that “civic virtue emerges which, with respect to taxation, 
shows up as tax morale,” contrasting that with “exploitative 
governments ruling their people in an authoritarian or even 
 
Posner, Law and Social Norms: The Case of Tax Compliance, 86 VA. L. REV. 1781, 1782 (2000) (“A 
widespread view among tax scholars holds that law enforcement does not explain why 
people pay taxes.”). 
 115. See Alm, supra note 114, at 3; infra note 116 and accompanying text. 
 116. Frey, supra note 52, at 92 (citations omitted) (quoting Alm, supra note 114); see also 
Ronald G. Cummings et al., Tax Morale Affects Tax Compliance: Evidence from Surveys and an 
Artefactual Field Experiment, 70 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 447, 449 (2009) (“[E]xtreme . . . risk 
aversion would be required to explain observed . . . compliance. Other factors must be at 
work.”); Frey, supra note 50, at 387 (making a similar argument). Feld and Frey estimated the 
1995 voluntary compliance rate for Switzerland at 77.7%. Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Tax 
Evasion in Switzerland: The Roles of Deterrence and Tax Morale, in TAX EVASION, TRUST AND 
STATE CAPACITIES 134 (Nicolas Hayoz & Simon Hug eds., 2007). 
 117. See Frey, supra note 50, at 388–89 (“[S]eek[ing] to demonstrate that intrinsic 
motivation in the form of ‘tax morale’ is of substantial importance in explaining tax 
paying behavior.”). 
 118. See id.; see also, e.g., Lars P. Feld & Bruno S. Frey, Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers 
Are Treated, 3 ECON. GOVERNANCE 87, 88 (2002) (“[T]he existence of an intrinsic motivation 
to pay taxes . . . has sometimes been called ‘tax morale.’”). This Article does not deny that 
there are intrinsic motivations to pay taxes. See infra text accompanying notes 161–166. The 
issue this Article tackles is whether deterrence crowds out those motivations, such that it 
reduces tax compliance. 
 119. Frey, supra note 50, at 390. 
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dictatorial way” and governments that lie between these poles.120 
Thus, Frey argues that, in places such as Switzerland, the deter-
rence model does not explain tax compliance; intrinsic motivations 
do. However, he found in a survey of Swiss cantons that fines 
increased tax compliance,121 which is contrary to his prediction and 
instead supports the deterrence model. 
Frey’s reliance on intrinsic motivation as the explanation for 
high compliance levels starts from the premise that if extremely 
high-risk aversion—which he rejects as not true in practice122—does 
not explain the observed compliance levels, there must be a missing 
factor, which he identifies as tax morale.123 However, tax morale 
need not be the explanation. In fact, Frey quotes Michael Graetz and 
Louis Wilde as stating, “the high compliance rate can only be 
explained either by taxpayers’ . . . commitment to the respon-
sibilities of citizenship and respect for the law or lack of opportunity 
for tax evasion.”124 These are not the same two possible explanations 
that Frey presents when he points to tax morale and risk aversion.125 
While there is certainly room for civic commitments and respect for 
the law as explanations for some compliance, the lack of 
opportunity for tax evasion—which Frey does not analyze as a 
possible explanation—explains much tax compliance and is 
consistent with the deterrence model.126 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. See id. at 397 (reporting that increased size of punishment decreases tax evasion); 
see also id. at 387 (stating that only the size of the fine was statistically significant at p < 0.05 
level in a model predicting tax evasion in the Swiss cantons). 
 122. See id. at 387. (“The conventionally used measure of risk aversion by Arrow-Pratt 
would have to be more than 30 in order to account for the present compliance rate in that 
country [the United States]. The actually measured level of risk aversion reported, however, 
lies only between 1 and 2.”). 
 123. See id. at 388 (arguing that the deterrence model “is at best incomplete, and may 
even be wrong” and that tax morale is “the missing factor”). 
 124. Id. at 389 (quoting Michael J. Graetz & Louis L. Wilde, The Economics of Tax 
Compliance: Facts and Fantasy, 3 NAT’L TAX J. 355, 358 (1985)) (emphasis added). On the same 
page, the Graetz and Wilde article states, “Any economic analysis of the various components 
of noncompliance must . . . take into account not only . . . institutional constraints on the level 
of punishment or audits, but also differences in opportunities to understate taxes.” Graetz & 
Wilde, supra at 358. 
 125. See supra text accompanying note 116 (quoting Frey, supra note 52, at 92, and 
referring to intrinsic motivation and risk aversion). 
 126. See, e.g., James Andreoni et al., Tax Compliance, 36 J. ECON. LIT. 818, 821 (1998) 
(“[W]e may ask, why are so many households honest, and why don’t cheaters cheat by more? 
Part of the explanation lies in the dramatic increase in information reporting . . . since the 
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1. The importance of opportunity to evade 
As I have explained in previous work, the stark dichotomy 
embodied in the purported puzzle sets aside an important feature 
of the federal income tax system, which is that taxpayers do not 
have an open opportunity to evade taxes on all of their income.127 
Many sources of income are subject to third-party reporting, and it 
is much easier for the government to match an information return 
with a taxpayer’s return than to conduct an audit. Thus, practically 
speaking, information-return matching is a highly effective form of 
audit not captured in audit statistics.128 Recent IRS figures show 
that the voluntary compliance rate with respect to income subject 
to withholding and substantial information reporting is 99%, and 
the rate with just substantial information reporting is 93%.129 Even 
income amounts subject to partial information reporting have a 
voluntary compliance rate of 81%. By contrast, income subject to no 
information reporting has a compliance rate of only 37%.130 One 
scholar accurately observed that use of third-party reporting is so 
 
1960s.”); Henrik Jacobsen Kleven et al., Unwilling or Unable to Cheat? Evidence from a Tax Audit 
Experiment in Denmark, 79 ECONOMETRICA 651, 653 (2011) (“[O]ur findings suggest that tax 
evasion is low, not because taxpayers are unwilling to cheat, but because they are unable to 
cheat successfully due to the widespread use of third-party reporting.”); Susan Cleary Morse 
et al., Cash Businesses and Tax Evasion, 20 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 37, 67 (2009) (“Our interview 
results here generally agree with other research cited above: Tax cheating follows 
opportunity, not complexity or immorality . . . .”); Mark D. Phillips, Individual Income Tax 
Compliance and Information Reporting: What Do the U.S. Data Show?, 67 NAT’L TAX J. 531, 563 
(2014) (“Using U.S. taxpayer-level data from the 2001 NRP, this paper has shown that the 
presence and amount of unmatched income are the primary determinants of income tax 
noncompliance.”); Joel Slemrod, Cheating Ourselves: The Economics of Tax Evasion, 21 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 25, 37 (2007) (“Line item by line item, there is a clear positive correlation between the 
rate of compliance and the presence of enforcement mechanisms such as information reports 
and employer withholding.”). 
 127. See, e.g., Leandra Lederman, Statutory Speed Bumps: The Roles Third Parties Play in 
Tax Compliance, 60 STAN. L. REV. 695, 697 (2007) (“An essential missing piece of this seeming 
puzzle is that the federal income tax law benefits from structural mechanisms that constrain 
payment with respect to the major sources of income for many people . . . .”); Lederman, 
supra note 70, at 1460 (“[T]he eighty-three percent [voluntary compliance] figure is 
misleading because it is an aggregate comprised of differing levels of compliance that 
correspond to differences in opportunity to evade tax.”). 
 128. Leandra Lederman, Tax Compliance and the Reformed IRS, 51 KAN. L. REV. 971, 
975 (2003). 
 129. See INTERNAL REVENUE SVC., supra note 113, at 5. 
 130. Id. The fact that this is not zero is discussed infra in text accompanying notes  
150–152. 
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widespread that “the notion that deterrence is weak is to some 
extent an illusion.”131 
Moreover, a study in Denmark found a near-zero noncom-
pliance rate by individuals for income subject to information 
reporting, which contrasted with a substantial noncompliance rate 
by the same individuals for income not subject to third-party 
reporting.132 This was true both for individuals with mostly self-
reported income and for those with mostly third-party-reported 
income.133 In particular, “the evasion rate for self-employment 
income conditional on third-party reporting is only 0.33%, 
suggesting that overall tax evasion among the self-employed is 
large because of the information environment and not because of, 
for example, different preferences among those choosing self-
employment (such as attitudes toward risk and cheating).”134 
A laboratory experiment also supports the notion that the same 
individual reports third-party-reported income at a higher rate 
than other income.135 Participants in the study had the opportunity 
to earn income by doing a simple task on the computer.136 They 
were then told how much of the income is “matched” (subject to 
information reporting) and how much is “nonmatched.”137 Their 
reports were subject to audit at a rate of 10% or 30%.138 The study 
found that the overall compliance rate for matched income was 
 
 131. Dwenger et al., supra note 42, at 204; see also Erzo F.P. Luttmer & Monica Singhal, 
Tax Morale, 28 J. ECON. PERSP. 149, 152 (2014) (explaining that, given low evasion on amounts 
reported to the IRS, “inferring tax morale as residual compliance in the Allingham and 
Sandmo (1972) model is credible only in settings without third-party reporting”). 
 132. Kleven et al., supra note 126, at 653. 
 133. Id. In Denmark, information received from third-party information reports is 
included in prepopulated returns that taxpayers are sent to complete. Id. at 659. 
 134. Id. at 670. The evasion level in that study for self-reported income was 41.6%. Id. 
at 671. Kleven et al. also found that “the effects of social variables are small and mostly 
insignificant, whereas variables that capture information (presence and size of self-reported 
income, self-employment, audit flags, and prior audit adjustments) have very strong effects. 
This confirms the conclusion that information and traceability are central to the compliance 
decision.” Id. at 676. 
 135. James Alm et al., Do Individuals Comply on Income Not Reported by Their Employer?, 
37 PUB. FIN. REV. 120, 121 (2009). 
 136. Id. at 127. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. “Increasing the audit probability from 10 to 30 percent increases compliance by 
4.9 percentage points, all else equal.” Id. at 136. That variable was significant at p < 0.01. See 
id. at 135 tbl.3. 
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54.2%, while for nonmatched income it was 41.4%, and the 
difference was statistically significant.139 
Opportunity to evade is relevant for firms, too. For example, 
Dina Pomeranz found a positive effect of an audit threat on 
compliance by Chilean firms with a Value-Added Tax (VAT), 
which was submitted monthly.140 The Chilean tax authority sent 
102,000 randomly selected companies a letter stating, in part, “your 
firm has been selected for analysis. In the event that any 
irregularities are detected, you could be summoned for an audit.”141 
The result was an immediate increase in VAT remittances,142 and it 
was primarily driven by the transactions for which there is no 
paper trail—sales to customers—as opposed to between-firm 
transactions in the supply chain, where firms have an incentive to 
ask for receipts from their suppliers.143 Thus, it appears that the 
existence of a paper trail, like an increase in the audit rate, raises 
perceived detection risk.144 
Similarly, James Alm et al. found that the average compliance 
rate across the New Mexico firms in their study was 43%, but it 
varied widely across industries.145 They found that firms that have 
a greater opportunity to evade taxes—as evidenced by providing 
services, having an out-of-state mailing address, and exhibiting 
greater variation in claimed deductions—are less compliant with a 
sales tax.146 However, firms’ compliance increased when the 
(perceived) audit rate increased.147 In fact, if an individual monitors 
firm compliance (contrary to the usual arrangement, where firms 
 
 139. Id. at 133 (p < 0.05). 
 140. Dina Pomeranz, No Taxation Without Information: Deterrence and Self-Enforcement in 
the Value Added Tax, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 2539, 2543 (2015). 
 141. Id. at 2547 & n.16. 
 142. “The median declared VAT increases by about 12 percent and then slowly de-
creases to reach the same levels as the control group after about 15 months.” Id. at 2557. 
 143. Id. at 2540, 2543–44. 
 144. Id. at 2541. 
 145. James Alm et al., Audit Selection and Firm Compliance with a Broad-Based Sales Tax, 
57 NAT’L TAX J. 209, 217 (2004). 
 146. Id. at 225. Missing filing deadlines was also a statistically significant predictor of 
noncompliance. Id. at 223. 
 147. Id. at 211, 223–25. 
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generally provide information reports on individuals148), studies 
suggest that firms’ compliance increases.149 
2. Other factors affecting tax compliance 
These studies, which highlight the importance of the 
opportunity to evade, support the idea that deterrence spurs 
compliance. Of course, lack of opportunity to evade does not 
explain all tax compliance.150 For one thing, U.S. taxpayers pay an 
estimated 37% of tax dollars due on income not subject to 
information reporting, such as self-employment income.151 That 
figure is quite low in comparison to the other voluntary compliance 
figures, but it is not zero.152 
 
 148. See Leandra Lederman, Reducing Information Gaps to Reduce the Tax Gap: When Is 
Information Reporting Warranted?, 78 FORDHAM L. REV. 1733, 1739–40 (2010) (explaining that 
information reporting is most efficient when done by centralized parties acting at arms’ 
length and with a bookkeeping infrastructure, which typically means businesses). 
 149. See generally Todd Kumler et al., Enlisting Employees in Improving Payroll-Tax 
Compliance: Evidence from Mexico (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 19385, 
Apr. 2015), http://www.columbia.edu/~ev2124/research/KumlerVerhoogen&FriasApril 
2015.pdf (finding that pension reform that gave younger workers an incentive to monitor 
their employers’ wage reporting, and the information to do so, resulted in reduced 
underreporting of wages for younger workers by firms (and thus reduced payroll tax 
evasion)); Joana Naritomi, Consumers as Tax Auditors (May 2016) (working paper), 
https://www.dropbox.com/s/1e0bctgjji4s01c/naritomi_enforcement_May2016.pdf?dl=0 
(finding that a São Paulo, Brazil, program that provided consumers with incentives in the 
form of tax rebates and lottery participation for requesting receipts, as well as for checking 
online the retailers’ reports of their transactions, increased retailers’ reported revenues for 
tax purposes by at least 22% over a four-year period). 
 150. See Andreoni et al., supra note 126, at 822 (explaining that, for 1992, 91.7% of all 
reportable income was reported, although only three-quarters of income was subject to 
information reporting). Taxpayers who receive most of their income in forms subject to 
information reporting could cheat by inventing or exaggerating deductions or credits not 
subject to information reporting. However, IRS data show that much more noncompliance 
occurs on the income side of the ledger. New IRS Study Provides Preliminary Tax Gap Estimate, 
I.R.S. News Release IR-2005-38 (Mar. 29, 2005), https://www.irs.gov/uac/New-IRS-Study 
-Provides-Preliminary-Tax-Gap-Estimate (“For individual underreporting, more than 80 
percent comes from understated income, not overstated deductions.”). One reason is that 
some taxpayers who are willing to skip an item may not be willing to affirmatively lie. M. 
Bernard Aidinoff et al., Report and Recommendations on Taxpayer Compliance, 41 TAX LAW. 329, 
376 (1988). In addition, inflated amounts that appear on the return are easier for the IRS to 
audit than wholly unreported items are. 
 151. See INTERNAL REVENUE SVC., TAX GAP FOR TAX YEAR 2006 OVERVIEW (Jan. 6, 2012), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/newsroom/overview_tax_gap_2006.pdf. 
 152. Of course, much of that reporting could be deterrence-motivated, including 
reporting amounts received with a paper trail, such as via credit card. 
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Part of that level of compliance may be due to deterrence 
aspects that are missing from the very basic model described above, 
such as criminal penalties. First, individuals may be risk averse 
about the prospect of going to prison, as well as the stigma 
associated with criminal tax evasion.153 They may also overestimate 
the likelihood of prosecution, which is very small.154 Two empirical 
studies using IRS data found that criminal tax enforcement 
increases tax compliance.155 
Second, the simple economic model applied above treated the 
audit rate as exogenously determined, which is not realistic. The 
likelihood that a taxpayer will be audited is endogenous, in that it 
depends on what the taxpayer reports.156 The IRS does some 
random audits for research purposes and selects some taxpayers 
for audit for other reasons, but its primary approach is to score tax 
returns using a secret formula designed to detect which returns are 
most noncompliant.157 Thus, an average audit rate may be 
misleadingly low as applied to someone engaging in tax evasion. 
 
 153. See Steven Klepper & Daniel Nagin, The Anatomy of Tax Evasion, 5 J.L. ECON. & 
ORG. 1, 21 (1989) (“For tax evasion, fear of stigmatization may be a particularly powerful 
deterrent because most taxpayers have no criminal record.”); see also Jeffrey A. Dubin, 
Criminal Investigation Enforcement Activities and Taxpayer Noncompliance, 35 PUB. FIN. REV. 500, 
523 (2007) (finding that incarceration and probation have a greater influence than fines on 
tax compliance). 
 154. Between fiscal years 2007 and 2016, the IRS initiated an average of 2621 tax inves-
tigations each year, peaking at 3325 in 2013. Enforcement Statistics, IRS, https://www.irs.gov 
/compliance/criminal-investigation/enforcement-statistics-criminal-investigation-ci-enforce 
ment-strategy (last updated Sept. 30, 2017). 
 155. See Dubin, supra note 153, at 502 (finding statistically significant positive results 
from IRS Criminal Investigation prosecutions resulting in sentences on tax compliance); 
Alan H. Plumley, The Determinants of Individual Income Tax Compliance: Estimating the Impacts 
of Tax Policy, Enforcement, and IRS Responsiveness, I.R.S. Publication 1916, at 36 (Nov. 1996), 
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/pub1916b.pdf (finding that U.S. states with a higher 
proportion of criminal tax convictions have higher compliance with tax-reporting 
obligations, and also finding that criminal convictions have “an equally significant, but 
smaller, positive impact on offsets reporting”). 
 156. See, e.g., James Alm et al., Tax Compliance with Endogenous Audit Selection Rules, 46 
KYKLOS 27, 27 (1993) (“[T]he government tax agency does not select tax returns randomly for 
audit but instead uses information from the returns to determine strategically whom 
to audit.”). 
 157. Leigh Osofsky, Concentrated Enforcement, 16 FLA. TAX REV. 325, 335–36 (2014) 
(“[V]arious government authorities have indicated that the IRS . . . employs a ‘worst-first’ 
approach by focusing on taxpayers who are likely to be the most noncompliant, as 
determined by deviation from others.”). 
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Sophisticated models of tax compliance treat the audit rate 
as endogenous.158 
Third, that very basic economic model ignores the possibility of 
“non-pecuniary costs of evading taxes such as embarrassment, loss 
of self-esteem, and social status.”159 A taxpayer may also increase 
compliance to try to avoid the time, hassle, and expense involved 
in an audit.160 
However, other factors undoubtedly affect tax compliance. For 
example, some studies have shown a limited positive effect of 
procedural fairness by the tax collector.161 A cross-country study in 
Latin America found a positive effect of better governance 
institutions, particularly citizen “voice” in government, supporting 
Swiss scholar Bruno Frey’s argument that higher tax morale 
increases tax compliance.162 Yet studies generally do not show a 
positive effect of moral suasion letters that focus on the public 
goods that the government provides to taxpayers, such as 
 
 158. See, e.g., Allingham & Sandmo, supra note 103, at 331–32 (including a model with 
audit rate endogenously determined); Andreoni et al., supra note 126, at 824–31 (discussing 
two variations on a model, one in which the tax authority pre-commits to an audit rule and 
one in which it does not). 
 159. Sharmila King & Steven M. Sheffrin, Tax Evasion and Equity Theory: An Investigative 
Approach, 9 INT’L TAX & PUB. FIN. 505, 507 (2002). 
 160. See Helen V. Tauchen, Tax Compliance: An Investigation Using Individual Taxpayer 
Compliance Measurement Program (TCMP) Data, 9 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 177, 194 
(1993) (“Fears of bureaucracy, time costs, and other factors associated with an audit may play 
as important a role in securing compliance as do the monetary penalties that might result 
from an audit.”); cf. Stephan Muehlbacher et al., Uncertainty Resolution in Tax Experiments: 
Why Waiting for an Audit Increases Compliance, 41 J. SOCIO-ECON. 289, 290 (2012) (finding 
higher tax compliance in a lab experiment if the random audits were conducted three weeks 
later instead of immediately). 
 161. See Lederman, supra note 128, at 1000–04 (discussing studies of this issue). 
 162. See Richard M. Bird et al., Societal Institutions and Tax Effort in Developing Countries, 
15 ANNALS OF ECON. & FIN. 185, 209 (2014). The voice variables are statistically significant, 
generally at p < 0.01. See id. at 211 tbl.2. That study also found a positive effect of a “Tax 
Morale” variable that was based on the per-country level of self-reported belief in the 
justifiability of tax cheating. See id. at 201, 207, 216 tbl.7 (defining the terms and the variable; 
reporting effects, which were significant at p < 0.05 for “Revenue Effort,” defined as current 
revenues/gross domestic product, but not significant for “Tax Effort”). 
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education and snow removal,163 even in Switzerland,164 where tax 
morale is stated to be high.165 
By contrast, several field studies have shown that appealing to 
compliance norms may have a positive effect.166 In fact, norms-
based appeals may bolster enforcement efforts.167 A 2009 study of 
individuals from the neighboring countries of Botswana and South 
Africa168 supports the idea that enforcement efforts are more 
effective where compliance norms are stronger. The study first 
compared the self-reported commitment to honest taxpaying 
among individuals in the two countries and found self-reported 
honesty to be higher in Botswana than in South Africa.169 That 
suggests a stronger taxpaying norm in Botswana. 
The study then compared the simulated tax compliance 
decisions of individuals from the two countries because they have 
 
 163. See, e.g., Arial, supra note 73, at 27, 41–45, 58 (finding that a letter to Israeli 
corporations, explaining how tax dollars were allocated, providing reasons for paying taxes, 
and highlighting the societal harm from not paying, resulted in a small but statistically 
significant effect in the direction of noncompliance with a Value Added Tax (VAT)); STEPHEN 
COLEMAN, MINN. DEP’T OF REVENUE, THE MINNESOTA INCOME TAX COMPLIANCE 
EXPERIMENT: STATE TAX RESULTS 5 (1996), http://www.revenue.state.mn.us/research_stats 
/research_reports/19xx/research_reports_content_complnce.pdf (finding no effect of letter 
stating “your income tax dollars are spent on services that we Minnesotans depend on” and 
listing items). But cf. Michael Chirico et al., An Experimental Evaluation of Notification Strategies 
to Increase Property Tax Compliance: Free-Riding in the City of Brotherly Love, in 30 TAX POL’Y & 
ECON. 129, 146 tbl.5 (Jeffrey R. Brown ed.) (2016), http://www.nber.org/chapters/c13 
690.pdf (finding that a Public Service letter had a statistically significant effect at p < 0.05 on 
one subgroup, single-property owners). A U.K. study combined a norms-based appeal and 
moral suasion into one letter, confounding the analysis. See John Hasseldine et al., Persuasive 
Communications: Tax Compliance Enforcement Strategies for Sole Proprietors, 24 CONTEMP. ACCT. 
RES. 171, 178 (2007). That letter was significant only for self-preparers (at p < 0.01). Id. at 181 
tbl.1, 184. 
 164. See Benno Torgler, Moral-Suasion: An Alternative Tax Policy Strategy? Evidence from 
a Controlled Field Experiment in Switzerland, 5 ECON. GOVERNANCE 235, 239–40 (2004). Torgler 
found an insignificant effect on timely filing or payment in Trimbach, Switzerland, of this 
moral appeal: “If the taxpayers did not contribute their share, our commune with its 6226 
inhabitants would suffer greatly. With your taxes you help keep Trimbach attractive for its 
inhabitants.” Id. at 240, 249–50 (emphasis omitted). 
 165. See supra text accompanying notes 118–120. 
 166. See Lederman, supra note 70, at 1471–75 (describing these studies). 
 167. See id. at 1497–99. 
 168. Cummings et al., supra note 116, at 447. 
 169. Id. at 451–52. “The marginal effects indicate that being a resident of Botswana 
rather than of South Africa increases the probability of reporting the highest tax honesty by 
around 6 percentage points, and this result is robust . . . .” Id. at 452. This is significant at 
p < 0.01. Id. at 452 tbl.3. 
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similar tax systems, but South Africa is much less politically 
stable.170 The authors framed the experiment as a tax-reporting 
decision where reporting could be audited and a fine imposed on 
undisclosed income.171 The audit rate was endogenously deter-
mined based on the amount of income reported.172 
The study found greater compliance by individuals in 
Botswana than those in South Africa, as the authors expected.173 
They attributed that result to higher tax morale in Botswana, which 
has better governance.174 However, what the study actually tested 
was the effect of differing compliance norms and cultures on a 
simulated taxpaying decision.175 Because the two countries are 
similar apart from their quality of governance, it is logical to 
hypothesize that the better government resulted in stronger 
taxpaying norms.176 However, the authors did not test that, and it 
is theoretically possible that stronger taxpaying norms (resulting 
from some other cause) and the resulting higher tax payments 
produced better governance structures.177 
Regardless, what is most important from a deterrence 
perspective is that the Botswana/South Africa study also found 
that, for both countries, compliance rates increase with an increase 
in the audit or penalty rate.178 This suggests that deterrence does 
not crowd out intrinsic motivations to pay taxes. In fact, the authors 
found that “while compliance does increase with enforcement 
effort, the effect is less in the country for which governance is less 
good.”179 This suggests that enforcement and tax morale—if that is 
 
 170. Id. at 449–50. 
 171. Id. at 453. 
 172. Id. at 454. 
 173. Id. at 455–56. This effect is significant at p < 0.05. Id. 
 174. Id. at 450 (“Botswana . . . refers to itself as the ‘gem of Africa’ in many . . . 
publications.” (citation omitted)). 
 175. Id. at 449, 452 (“[T]he objective of our research is to examine the effect of cultural 
factors and social norms on tax compliance behavior . . . .”). 
 176. The authors state that “[i]f these norms evolve from perceptions that the quality of 
governance is high, we predict we will observe differences in tax compliance that are 
correlated with these perceptions.” Id. at 449. 
 177. Cf. Bird et al., supra note 162, at 209 (pointing out these two possibilities in 
their study). 
 178. Cummings et al., supra note 116, at 454. The effect of the audit rate is significant at 
p < 0.01. Id. at 455 tbl.6. The significance of the penalty rate is not reported. 
 179. Id. at 448. This study thus supports the argument that enforcement complements 
compliance norms. See Lederman, supra note 70. 
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what is driving the differing compliance rates across the two 
countries—may be complements, not substitutes. 
And even if higher tax morale stemming from good govern-
ment increases compliance, as Frey argues, this section has shown 
that that does not by any means counter the effectiveness of 
deterrence. The next section adds to the force of the deterrence 
model by showing the positive effect on taxpayer compliance of 
audits, which are a key component of the deterrence model, and the 
smaller, but still generally positive, effect of sanctions. 
B. The Effectiveness of Particular Deterrence Tools 
1. Audits and audit threats 
Generally speaking, the existence of audits has been found to 
have a positive effect on tax compliance. Several studies have found 
that increasing the audit rate increases compliance.180 In the United 
States, the IRS has found both a direct effect of audits on tax 
collections181 and an indirect effect of audits of approximately six 
dollars for each dollar collected directly through enforcement.182 
 
 180. See James Alm, Tax Compliance and Administration, in HANDBOOK ON TAXATION 741, 
756 (W. Bartley Hildreth & James A. Richardson eds., 1999) (“Nearly all studies have found 
that a higher (random) audit rate leads to more compliance . . . ; however, . . . this impact 
appears to be small and nonlinear, so that the deterrent effect of a higher audit rate 
eventually diminishes.” (citation omitted)); see also, e.g., Alm et al., supra note 135, at 135–36 
(finding in lab experiment that “[t]he compliance rate increases by 3.8 percentage points for 
an increase in the audit success rate of 25 percentage points”); Nipoli Kamdar, Corporate 
Income Tax Compliance: A Time Series Analysis, 25 ATLANTIC ECON. J. 37, 45–46 (1997) (finding 
for the sample period of 1961 to 1987 that “audits play a statistically significant role in 
promoting corporate [tax] compliance”); Plumley, supra note 155, at 35–36 (finding an 11.7 to 
1 indirect effect of audits started in 1991). Note that laboratory experiments, which use 
computer simulations, can determine the participant’s actual compliance. Field experiments 
cannot, so they generally compare changes in reported income (or some other 
reported amount). 
 181. The National Taxpayer Advocate reported that the direct effect of IRS audits of 
1.5% of self-employed taxpayers in fiscal year 2014 was more than $3 billion in recommended 
additional taxes. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, Audit Impact Study, in 2 TAS RESEARCH AND 
RELATED STUDIES 67, 68 (2015), http://www.taxpayeradvocate.irs.gov/Media/Default 
/Documents/2015ARC/ARC15_Volume2_3-AuditImpact.pdf. For fiscal years 2008–10, the 
IRS anticipated collecting an average of $52 billion via late payments and enforcement 
actions. See INTERNAL REVENUE SVC., supra note 113, at 3. 
 182. See Department of the Treasury: Internal Revenue Service, in APPENDIX, BUDGET OF THE 
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2016, at 1035, 1035, https://www.gpo.gov 
/fdsys/pkg/BUDGET-2016-APP/pdf/BUDGET-2016-APP-1-19.pdf; see also Jeffrey A. 
Dubin et al., The Effect of Audit Rate on the Federal Individual Income Tax, 1977–1986, 43 NAT’L 
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Moreover, a recent study found that an increase in the IRS’s face-
to-face audit rate has a positive spillover effect on individuals’ 
compliance with state income taxes.183 This makes sense, given that 
state income tax regimes generally use the federal income tax base 
as a starting point.184 
The positive effect of audits is not limited to the United States. 
For example, Kleven et al. conducted an experiment in Denmark 
involving both actual audits and letters threatening audit. They 
thoroughly audited half of a representative sample of more than 
42,000 individual income taxpayers, some employees and some 
self-employed.185 They found a statistically significant positive 
effect of the audits on income reported in the following year. The 
difference was entirely due to income not subject to third-party 
reporting,186 which is the income that is less visible absent an audit. 
The year after the audits, Kleven et al. subdivided the audited 
and unaudited taxpayers who were employees into three groups 
each.187 The subdivisions were for a group that got no letter, a group 
that was sent a letter informing its recipients that 50% of the group 
would be audited, and a group sent a letter stating that the 
recipient’s return definitely would be audited.188 The study found 
that “audit threats have a positive impact on self-reported 
income”189 and that the effect was about twice as strong for the 
guaranteed audit than for the 50% audit threat.190 The effect of 
 
TAX J. 395, 405 (1990) (finding that that the indirect effect of audits is responsible for six out 
of every seven dollars of tax revenue); cf. Tauchen, supra note 160, at 179 (finding a two-to-
one indirect effect in a 1979 dataset). 
 183. Liucija Birskyte, Effects of Tax Auditing: Does the Deterrent Deter?, 8 RES. J. ECON., 
BUS. & ICT 1, 6 (2013). The study used aggregate data from all forty-one states that levied a 
broad-based income tax. Id. at 3. The study found that “[a] 1% increase in federal audit rate, 
on the average, increases individual income state tax collected per return by 1.74 dollars, 
holding other variables constant.” Id. at 5. This was significant at the p < 0.01 level. Id. 
 184. See Heather M. Field, Binding Choices: Tax Elections & Federal/State Conformity, 32 
VA. TAX REV. 527, 532 (2013). 
 185. Kleven et al., supra note 126, at 660. 
 186. Id. at 654. “For the full sample, the effect on total net income is 2557 kroner or 30.1 
cents per additional kroner of audit adjustment. The effect on tax liability is 1375 kroner, 
corresponding to 41.7 cents per dollar of audit adjustment. These estimates are strongly 
significant.” Id. at 685. 
 187. Id. at 653, 662. 
 188. Id. at 653, 662–63. 
 189. Id. at 654. 
 190. Id. at 688. 
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receiving an audit-threat letter was similar for the group that had 
been audited the prior year and the group that had not.191 Kleven 
et al. explained:  
Because audits are rare events for a taxpayer, they are likely to 
provide new information and therefore lead to a change in the 
perceived detection probability. We may think of the detection 
probability as a product of two probabilities: the probability of 
audit and the probability of detection conditional on audit. Audits 
may have an effect through both channels.192 
 The Chilean VAT study mentioned above included an audit-
with-prior-notice treatment. The tax authority sent half of a sample 
of companies with reporting patterns suggesting tax evasion193 
prior notice of an audit, then summoned the whole group for an 
audit.194 The study found that the deterrent effect of the audit 
announcement had valuable spillover effects on companies in the 
supply chain: “The randomly administered audit announcement 
leads to strong spillover effects that increase VAT payments by the 
suppliers of the treated firms. In line with the asymmetric 
incentives between clients and suppliers in the self-enforcing 
mechanism of the VAT, tax payments of client firms do not 
increase.”195 The pro-compliance spillover effects are consistent 
with both IRS data on the U.S. federal income tax196 and the study 
that found a positive spillover of IRS audits onto state 
tax collections.197 
John Hasseldine and his coauthors studied sales and net profit 
reporting in the United Kingdom by sole proprietors who reported 
sales under £15,000 for two consecutive tax years.198 That amount 
reflects an important reporting threshold: individuals and 
partnerships with sales less than that amount were required to 
 
 191. Id. (“The broad conclusion from these estimates is that letter effects are roughly 
the same in the 0% and 100% audit groups.”). 
 192. Id. at 681. 
 193. These patterns included things such as continually reporting sales less than costs, 
without going out of business. Pomeranz, supra note 140, at 2549. 
 194. Id. at 2541, 2550. 
 195. Id. at 2541. 
 196. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
 197. See supra note 183 and accompanying text. 
 198. Hasseldine et al., supra note 163, at 171–72. 
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provide the tax authority only “turnover (sales), allowable 
deductions, and net profit,” whereas other businesses had to 
itemize all their income and expenses—a more burdensome 
reporting obligation.199 
Hasseldine et al. studied five types of letters from Inland 
Revenue, including three sanction letters: (1) an audit threat, (2) a 
“threat of audit with possible penalties,” and (3) an audit with prior 
notice (described as a “virtual guarantee of forthcoming audit once 
the return is filed”).200 They found that each of the three sanction 
letters increased the sole proprietors’ reported net profits, 
compared to the control group.201 The three sanction letters also all 
had a statistically significant effect on turnover reported over 
the threshold.202 
As discussed above, in a recent church tax study in Germany, 
the auditors knew the amount of tax due and thus could determine 
if a taxpayer under complied, fully complied, or over complied.203 
One set of treatments varied the audit probabilities announced in a 
letter between 10, 20, and 50%, as well as including notched 
probabilities stating that taxpayers faced an audit probability of 
50% if they pay €10 or less, and zero chance of audit otherwise.204 
The study found that this deterrence intervention had “strong 
effects on compliance for baseline evaders, but small and mostly 
insignificant effects for baseline donors”205—those who had 
overpaid the tax.206 In addition, the notched audit letter was very 
effective at increasing tax payments to more than €10.207 It is 
possible that taxpayers treat a church tax differently from other 
types of taxes. However, it is worth noting that this study not only 
 
 199. Id. at 177. 
 200. Id. at 172. 
 201. The “respective mean changes (F-statistics) of [Letters 3, 4, and 5 were] . . . £438 
(4.303), £731 (19.431), and £976 (31.156).” Id. at 184. These increases were statistically 
significant at p < 0.05. Id. 
 202. Id. at 181 (p < 0.05). While 39.7% of the control group reported turnover above the 
threshold, the sanction groups were all above 50%. Id. (“The respective percentages  
(x2-statistics) for those four groups were . . . 53.8 percent (x2 = 60.929), 56.4 percent (x2 = 
82.075), and 53.7 percent (x2 = 42.575).”). 
 203. See Dwenger et al., supra note 42, at 204. 
 204. Id. at 223. 
 205. Id. at 205. 
 206. See id. at 204. 
 207. Id. at 223. 
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supports the effectiveness of audit threats but also the possibility of 
a slight “crowding in” of intrinsic motivations.208 This effect is 
similar to the study comparing Botswana and South Africa, which 
found that enforcement increased compliance more in Botswana, 
the country with stronger compliance norms.209 
The Minnesota Tax Compliance Experiment, which examined 
the effects of several different letters on individual taxpayers, found 
a slightly more mixed effect of an audit with prior notice (a letter to 
a group of taxpayers stating that his or her return would be closely 
examined, which it subsequently was).210 That letter increased 
reported income and taxes paid for about 96.7% of the population—
all but high-income taxpayers.211 Moreover, the audit with prior 
notice, which had a pro-compliance effect on taxpayers in the low- 
and middle-income strata, had a greater effect on low- and middle-
income taxpayers who were “high-risk”212—those filing a federal 
Schedule C for self-employment income or Schedule F for 
farm income.213  
However, the audit letter’s results were mixed and possibly 
negative for the 3.3% of the population defined as “high income” 
(those who have federal adjusted gross income of more than 
$100,000).214 A recent study by Mazzolini et al. found a similar 
result in Italy on the effect of actual audits: “[T]he average positive 
audit effect that we detected . . . is driven by low and middle 
reported-income taxpayers, while the effect is even negative at the 
highest decile.”215 
 
 208. Id. 
 209. See supra text accompanying note 179. 
 210. COLEMAN, supra note 163, at 10–12. 
 211. Id. at 10–12, 22. Once the results were weighted to make the sample proportional 
to the population, the additional taxes, when computed for the population of Minnesota, 
would amount to $73 million for 1993. Stephen Coleman, Income Tax Compliance: A Unique 
Experiment in Minnesota, GOV’T FIN. REV., Apr. 1997, at 5. 
 212. COLEMAN, supra note 163, at 12 (finding high-risk low- and middle-income 
taxpayers increased reported taxes by $186 more than the controls, on average, compared to 
$36 for the low-risk low- and middle-income taxpayers). 
 213. Id. 2. 
 214. Id. at 11. 
 215. Gabriele Mazzolini et al., The Deterrence Effect of Real-World Operational Tax Audits 
21, 45 tbl.A1 (Dep’t of Econ. Mgmt. & Statistics, Univ. of Milan–Bicocca, Working Paper No. 
359, Jan. 2017), http://dems.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper359.pdf. 
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A recent study by Jason DeBacker et al. of U.S. C corporations 
found an analogous result: corporations receiving a positive 
adjustment (increase in taxes) in an IRS audit “subsequently 
become more tax aggressive than when they receive a zero or 
negative adjustment.”216 By contrast, their study of individuals 
found that a positive adjustment increased compliance in the first 
years after the audit.217 Taken together, the DeBacker, Mazzolini, 
and Minnesota findings suggest that an audit may increase tax 
aggressiveness in taxpayers with the most resources (who 
presumably can afford to have a tax adviser and may be more likely 
to treat tax reporting as a negotiation218). 
In addition, although Minnesota’s audit letter had a positive 
effect on taxpayers who had had their prior year’s taxes adjusted, it 
had a negative effect on the subgroup who had paid a penalty the 
year before. Moreover, the higher the penalty had been, the larger 
the effect was.219 This could suggest an attempt at loss recoupment, 
an effect discussed in Part III of this Article. 
A recent study using country-level data hypothesized and 
found a “U-shaped association between auditing220 and tax 
evasion,”221 meaning “that compliance increases until a certain 
auditing level is reached, and decreases beyond that level (i.e., an 
elevated auditing level backfires).”222 However, it is important to 
note that that study used as its measure of tax evasion “business 
executives’ perception of the extent to which tax evasion is common 
 
 216. Jason DeBacker et al., Legal Enforcement and Corporate Behavior: An Analysis of Tax 
Aggressiveness After an Audit, 58 J. LAW & ECON. 291, 311 (2015). 
 217. See infra text accompanying note 343. 
 218. See Joel Slemrod et al., Taxpayer Response to an Increased Probability of Audit: Evidence 
from a Controlled Experiment in Minnesota, 79 J. PUB. ECON. 455, 480–81 (2001). 
 219. COLEMAN, supra note 163, at 11. Results like this suggest that in studies along the 
lines of the Israeli Day-care Center Study, it is worth examining separately the effects of the 
fine regime on those who have been fined and those who have not been fined. See supra notes 
61 and 68. 
 220. The overall audit rate is “the number of verification actions” divided by “the total 
number of registered taxpayers for personal and corporate income taxes.” Juan P. Mendoza 
et al., The Backfiring Effect of Auditing on Tax Compliance, 62 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 284, 287 (2017). 
Thus, it is a blend of individual and corporate audit rates. “[Eighty-five percent] of the 
untransformed auditing level observations lie between 0.2 and 20 verification actions per 100 
taxpayers.” Id. at 288. 
 221. Id. at 284. 
 222. Id. at 285. 
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practice in their country,”223 not actual government estimates of tax 
evasion rates. Thus, what the study actually found is a correlation 
between an overall audit rate that is higher than the average for the 
countries studied224 and a higher perception of tax evasion on the 
part of business executives. This outcome could suggest that the 
correlation runs the other way: a comparatively high audit rate 
causes businesspeople to perceive that noncompliance is high.225 
The authors try to address that issue but state that “[a]lthough 
[various] tests provide support for our hypothesis, endogeneity 
cannot be fully ruled out with the available data . . . .”226 
 
 223. Id. at 286. “Respondents are top and middle management executives.” Id. at 287. 
 224. The study includes fifty countries, including many countries that belong to the 
Organisation for Economic Development. See id. at 289 tbl.2 (listing countries ranging from 
Argentina to United States). 
 225. That would presumably be because a high audit rate is a signal that the 
government has determined that the enforcement rate needs to be high. A comparatively 
low audit rate could also cause businesspeople to perceive that noncompliance is high 
because of the risk that enforcement levels are too low to provide significant deterrence. 
 226. Mendoza et al., supra note 220, at 292. To deal with endogeneity, the Mendoza et 
al. study used “a two-step system GMM estimator (Roodman, 2006), which uses lags as 
instruments of possibly endogenous regressors.” Id. at 291. They note that “the number of 
instruments does not exceed the number of countries (i.e., 47 < 50) . . . .” Id. This comports 
with the “rule of thumb . . . to worry if the instrument count exceeds N.” David Roodman, 
How to Do xtabond2: An Introduction to “Difference” and “System” GMM in Stata 43 (Ctr. for 
Glob. Dev., Working Paper No. 103, Dec. 2006), http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.982943. 
However, in a companion paper that Mendoza et al. also cite, Roodman explains that that 
limit is too high when the equation has endogenous regressors, and that the two-step system 
GMM estimates become particularly problematic as the number of instruments approaches 
N (in this case, the number of countries). See David Roodman, A Note on the Theme of Too 
Many Instruments, 71 OXFORD BULL. ECON. & STAT. 135, 140 (2009); see also id. at 142 (citing 
other studies that “suggest that merely keeping the instrument count below N does not 
safeguard the [Hansen] J-test”). Roodman also provides examples of this problem using 
replications of published empirical work. One study Roodman replicates “includes 75 
instruments, compared with 77 countries and 353 observations.” Id. at 153. He runs tests that 
reveal downward biases of standard errors caused by the large number of the instruments 
in that study and finds that, if the number of instruments is reduced, the Hansen J statistic 
declines dramatically, suggesting invalidity of system GMM instruments. Id. at 155. And if 
the problematic system GMM instruments are dropped, several explanatory variables lose 
their statistical significance. Roodman concludes that the “facts suggest that instrument 
invalidity is the source of the . . . results.” Id. at 156. The author thanks Michael Alexeev for 
pointing out this issue. 
 It would be helpful to examine Mendoza et al.’s analysis of the data. The article states 
that “[i]nstructions to access the dataset and conduct the analysis are presented in the 
Appendix.” Mendoza et al., supra note 220, at 286. However, the appendix does not seem to 
accompany the article. 
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Overall, these results suggest that an audit regime and audit 
threats generally are effective deterrents. The next section focuses 
on the effects of penalties, and Part III discusses the direct effect of 
audits on the audited taxpayer’s subsequent reporting. 
2. Penalties 
 a. Public goods games. The effects of penalties or penalty threats 
may not be the same as the effects of audits or audit threats. How-
ever, laboratory experiments involving contributions to a public 
good provide support for the beneficial effects of sanctions.227 In 
these games, each participant is given an initial sum and the 
opportunity to invest some or all of it in a group fund. The 
experimenter will multiply the pot by a positive number and divide 
the resulting amount equally among all participants regardless of 
who contributed to the pot. Typically, the game is played for a set 
number of rounds.228 The game is structured so that the best result 
for the group is if everyone contributes the full stake provided by 
the experimenter, while each individual’s maximizing strategy is to 
contribute nothing, free riding on the others’ contributions.229 
These experiments have found that many participants do 
contribute, and on average, players start by contributing 40 to 60% 
of their stake.230 In later rounds, players usually mirror others’ 
contributions.231 Because some players free ride from the outset, 
 
 227. The experimental games discussed in this section all involve public goods, with 
players contributing to a common pool. Some of the initial experiments, however, such as 
ultimatum games, are two-party, reciprocity games. Houser et al. found a negative effect of 
punishment in a reciprocity context. Daniel Houser et al., When Punishment Fails: Research on 
Sanctions, Intentions and Non-Cooperation, 62 GAMES & ECON. BEHAV. 509, 523 (2008) 
(concluding in a gift-exchange game, where an “investor” sends an amount to a “trustee,” 
which the experimenter triples, that trustees responded negatively to monetary incentives, 
thus crowding out pro-social behavior). 
 228. See Lederman, supra note 70, at 1482. 
 229. See Elinor Ostrom, Collective Action and the Evolution of Social Norms, 14 J. ECON. 
PERSP. 137, 139 (2000) (explaining that a rational player rationally should contribute zero in 
the last round, and thus the penultimate round, and so on). 
 230. Id. at 140. 
 231. Id. at 142. One study found that approximately half of the players increased their 
contributions in response to increases in others’ contributions, 14% did the same up to certain 
contribution levels and then decreased their contributions, and approximately one-third of 
players were free riders. Urs Fischbacher et al., Are People Conditionally Cooperative? Evidence 
from a Public Goods Experiment, 71 ECON. LETTERS 397, 398 (2001). 
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and many mirror others’ behavior, the typical basic game results in 
a progressive decline in contributions over the ten rounds.232 
By contrast, when players can pay to punish defectors, that 
possibility generally dramatically increases cooperation.233 A study 
of the same public goods game in sixteen different countries found 
that a punishment option resulted in differing levels of cooperation 
in different countries, but in all of them, the availability of 
punishment prevented a breakdown in cooperation.234 Another 
experiment found that the least-trusting players were the most 
likely to become strong contributors where there was a punishment 
mechanism.235 One study found that punishment by a third party—
someone who had previously played the game—had a weaker 
effect than punishment by other players, but it still significantly 
increased contributions.236 
Mizuho Shinada and Toshio Yamagishi examined the mech-
anism by which punishment works. Their study of two one-shot 
prisoner’s dilemma games suggested that punishment has both a 
direct effect on cooperation by altering its payoffs and an indirect 
effect because it increases the expectation that others will 
cooperate.237 Moreover, this was true whether punishments were 
administered by other players or by a third party (the 
 
 232. Ostrom, supra note 229, at 140 (reporting that typically 70% of players contribute 
nothing in the pre-announced final round of a public goods game).  
To test whether players are learning the optimal strategy through successive rounds, 
some experiments included a surprise “restart.” See James Andreoni, Why Free Ride? 
Strategies and Learning in Public Goods Experiments, 37 J. PUB. ECON. 291, 300 (1988). They 
found that players returned to high levels of giving in round eleven, behaving similarly to 
round one, ruling out the possible explanation that it took players multiple rounds simply 
to learn the incentives in the game. Id. at 298. 
 233. Ernst Fehr & Simon Gächter, Cooperation and Punishment in Public Goods Experi-
ments, 90 AM. ECON. REV. 980 (2000); Colin F. Camerer & Ernst Fehr, Measuring Social Norms 
and Preferences Using Experimental Games: A Guide for Social Scientists 11–12 (Inst. for Empirical 
Research in Econ., Univ. of Zurich, Working Paper No. 97, Jan. 2002), https://www. 
zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/51997/1/iewwp097.pdf. 
 234. Benedikt Herrmann et al., Antisocial Punishment Across Societies, 319 SCI. 1362 
(2008); Benedikt Herrmann et al., Supporting Material for Antisocial Punishment Across 
Societies 33 (Feb. 12, 2008), http://science.sciencemag.org/content/sci/suppl/2008/03/06 
/319.5868.1362.DC1/Hermann.SOM.pdf 
 235. Fehr & Gächter, supra note 233, at 984–85; see also Ostrom, supra note 229, at 141. 
 236. Camerer & Fehr, supra note 233, at 13. 
 237. Mizuho Shinada & Toshio Yamagishi, Punishing Free Riders: Direct and Indirect 
Promotion of Cooperation, 28 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 330, 331–34 (2007). 
 
003.LEDERMAN_FIN2_NOHEADERS.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 2/17/19  7:43 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW 2018 
664 
experimenter).238 This is consistent with economic modeling of 
conditional cooperators239 and with IRS data suggesting that 
enforcement actions have a positive indirect (or “shadow”) effect 
on other taxpayers.240 
In sum, these studies suggest that the availability of costly 
punishment is very effective at increasing cooperation in an 
experimental setting.241 The next section looks at whether this 
extends to the tax context in field experiments. 
b. Tax-focused experiments. A number of experiments have 
examined the effects of sanctions on tax compliance. As mentioned 
above, an IRS study found that the proportion of criminal tax 
convictions positively influences taxpayer reporting of income, 
although that effect is somewhat reduced by increased reporting of 
offsets, such as credits.242 
With respect to monetary sanctions, studies sometimes find a 
positive effect,243 but they generally do not find as strong an effect 
of fines as they do of audit threats,244 or they do not get statistically 
 
 238. Id. at 334–37. 
 239. See Jon S. Davis et al., Social Behaviors, Enforcement, and Tax Compliance Dynamics, 
78 ACCT. REV. 39 (2003) (modeling this approach); Lederman, supra note 70 (arguing that this 
is what happens in the tax compliance context). 
 240. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
 241. Because punishment is costly, the cost of punishment could outweigh the gains to 
the group from increased cooperation. Simon Gächter et al., The Long-Run Benefits of Punish-
ment, 322 SCI. 1510, 1510 (2008). However, punishment generally increases cooperation over 
time and thus reduces the use of punishment. Gächter et al. conducted experiments 
involving games with punishment available and without a punishment option. They found 
higher average contributions in the punishment-option games, and they also found greater 
benefits of punishment in a fifty-round game than in a ten-round game. Id. 
 242. See Plumley, supra note 155, at 36. 
 243. See Alm, supra note 180, at 756 (“A higher fine rate leads to marginally more 
compliance, with an estimated reported income-fine rate elasticity less than 0.1.”); cf. Robert 
Mason & Lyle D. Calvin, Public Confidence and Admitted Tax Evasion, 37 NAT’L TAX J. 489, 493 
(2001) (finding from a survey of Oregon taxpayers that “[s]anction fear . . . is strongly related 
to compliance and suggests that the dissatisfied honest do not engage in tax fraud because 
they are afraid of getting caught”); Michael W. Spicer, Civilization at a Discount: The Problem 
of Tax Evasion, 39 NAT’L TAX J. 13, 15 (1986) (“Survey studies indicate that the incidence of 
tax evasion is inversely related to the fear of sanctions . . . .”). 
 244. See Boris Maciejovsky et al., Misperception of Chance and Loss Repair: On the 
Dynamics of Tax Compliance, 28 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 678, 684 (2007) (finding, in a lab experiment 
in Vienna, that “[e]ffect sizes suggest that audits have a stronger impact on compliance than 
fines”). The details of this experiment are discussed further below. See infra notes 270–280 
and accompanying text. 
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significant results.245 For example, a laboratory experiment 
conducted in the United States found that the severity of the fine 
(either twice or six times the evaded amount) had no effect on 
compliance.246 “[I]n fact, tax evasion is less with a two-times-fine 
rate with a three in six audit probability than a six-times-fine rate 
with a one in six audit probability.”247 Another U.S. lab experiment 
found that “[c]ompliance increases with an increase in the fine rate; 
however, the coefficient on FINERATE is so small that the fine rate 
elasticity is virtually zero, and the coefficient is also not 
highly significant.”248 
Why might sanctions have a small effect? The authors of the 
latter study, Jim Alm, Betty R. Jackson, and Michael McKee, explain 
that “[s]ince the probability of detection is small, large responses to 
changes in the fine rate would require extreme degrees of risk 
aversion.”249 Thus, a large fine may be little deterrent if there is little 
likelihood it will be imposed. 
Alm, Jackson, and McKee note that “[a] policy implication is 
that increasing penalties may not have a noticeable effect on 
compliance, unless the probability of detection is increased 
significantly.”250 A study in Washington State on reporting 
 
 245. See, e.g., Arial, supra note 163, at 43–52 (finding no statistically significant effect on 
corporate taxpayers of a letter “inform[ing] taxpayers that filing a false report will result in 
harsh sanctions”). The text of the letter is not included but is described. See id. at 43 (“The 
fact that tax noncompliance is a grave matter was emphasized more than once. . . . The types 
of available modes of punishment were highlighted. . . . Moreover, the letter informed the 
participant that the tax authority now uses new methods of auditing taxpayers. . . . [which] 
was intended to increase the perceived probability of detection and apprehension.”). 
 246. Paul Webley, Audit Probabilities and Tax Evasion in a Business Simulation, 25 ECON. 
LETTERS 267, 270 (1987). 
 247. Id.; see also Maciejovsky et al., supra 244, at 684 (“Effect sizes suggest that audits 
have a stronger impact on compliance than fines.”). But cf. Nehemiah Friedland et al., A 
Simulation Study of Income Tax Evasion, 10 J. PUB. ECON. 107, 110–11 (1978) (finding in study 
of fifteen Israeli undergraduates that increasing the fine rate from three times to fifteen times 
the amount evaded was a more effective deterrent than increasing the audit rate from one 
out of fifteen to five out of fifteen). 
 248. James Alm et al., Estimating the Determinants of Taxpayer Compliance with 
Experimental Data, 45 NAT’L TAX J. 107, 110 (1992). 
 249. Id. See also Chirico et al., supra note 163, at 150, 154 fig.2 (finding that a threat of 
seizure or sale of property written in large type resulted in positive effects, but they were 
small and statistically insignificant). 
 250. Alm et al., supra note 248, at 110. 
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compliance supports this suggestion.251 The study examined the 
effects of “increasing sanction awareness and threats of enhanced 
detection risk” on payments by construction businesses of (1) an 
excise tax on gross revenues called the Business and Occupation 
(B&O) tax and (2) “use taxes” due on items purchased out of state 
but used in state.252 The study found that receipt of either a 
“sanction-awareness” or “detection” letter253 was associated with 
increased reporting of the base subject to use tax,254 the effect they 
studied because of differences in applicable tax rates.255 However, 
for both taxes, the penalty letter resulted in only marginally 
significant effects without a manipulation of detection likelihood.256 
Overall, these studies suggest that audit threats are much more 
effective than sanction threats at increasing compliance. The 
general effectiveness of audit threats supports the notion that 
deterrence has positive rather than negative effects, as does the 
IRS’s data on the indirect effects of audits and the deterrent effect 
of criminal tax prosecutions.257 However, although these overall 
effects are important, they do not isolate the effects of audit on the 
 
 251. Govind Iyer et al., Increasing Tax Compliance in Washington State: A Field Experiment, 
63 NAT’L TAX J. 7 (2010). 
 252. Id. at 7–10 (parentheticals omitted) (“The use tax noncompliance rate is estimated 
at 18.1 percent while the B&O tax noncompliance rate is estimated at 2.2 percent.”). 
 253. The detection letter “explained that the DOR was trying to improve compliance 
with tax laws by examining tax returns to assess use tax underpayments. The detection 
manipulation also informed firms that the DOR required them to provide a detailed report 
of assets purchased and that these reports should be consistent with their Federal 
Depreciation Schedule . . . .” Id. at 14. 
 254. Id. at 21. “[W]hen penalty information is communicated to the taxpayers 
(penalty/no detection scenario), the reported use tax base increases to 8.97 (significant at . . . 
p = 0.07).” Id. at 22. They also found “a significant effect for the Penalty*Detection variable 
(. . . p = 0.01).” Id. at 21. 
 255. Id. at 16. The study also found a modest spillover of the detection letter onto 
compliance with B&O taxes. Id. at 29. 
 256. Id. at 29. More specifically: 
When the taxpayers are asked to provide federal tax information (detection/no 
penalty scenario), the reported [logarithmic] use tax base variable increases [from 
8.42] to 9.28 (significant at . . . p = 0.004). Likewise, when penalty information is 
communicated to the taxpayers (penalty/no detection scenario), the reported use 
tax base increases to 8.97 (significant at . . . p = 0.07). 
Id. at 21–22; see also id. at 29 (“Penalty information [for B&O tax] is, as in the case of use tax, 
marginally significant in the absence of detection manipulation.”); id. at 22 (in use tax 
penalty/no detection manipulation, p was 0.07). 
 257. See Plumley, supra note 155; see also supra note 155 and accompanying text; supra 
notes 180–182 and accompanying text. 
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audited taxpayers themselves. That issue is discussed in the 
next Part. 
III. POST-AUDIT REDUCTION OF COMPLIANT BEHAVIOR 
It is possible that the audit itself affects taxpayer reporting 
behavior in a way that audit threats or audits of others do not. 
Audited taxpayers’ subsequent reporting behavior may also differ 
depending on aspects of the audit experience, such as whether the 
audit was random or not; whether the taxpayer was found 
undercompliant, fully compliant, or overcompliant in the audit; 
whether the taxpayer was required to pay a fine; and whether the 
taxpayer was subject to repeated audits. Several studies have 
examined the effect of audits on the future reporting behavior of 
those audited.258 The next section discusses laboratory experiments, 
and the following section discusses field experiments. 
A. The “Bomb-Crater Effect” in Laboratory Experiments 
Several laboratory experiments have examined the effects of 
audits on post-audit compliance behavior. These experiments are 
structured such that participants retaining more lab dollars net of 
“taxes” are paid more for participating.259 One of the earliest tested 
eight different conditions, each with sixty rounds.260 Each 
participant, an economics student from the University of Trento,261 
 
 258. See, e.g., Brian Erard, The Influence of Tax Audits on Reporting Behavior, in WHY 
PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 95, 113 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) 
(studying the effects of IRS audits on subsequent-year reporting and reaching inconclusive 
results); id. at 97–98 (reporting the results of a study finding that taxpayers experiencing a 
random research audit of their 1969 returns were slightly less likely to be found 
noncompliant on their 1971 returns, but the magnitude of noncompliance was unaffected) 
(citing Susan B. Long & Richard D. Schwartz, The Impact of IRS Audits on Taxpayer 
Compliance: A Field Experiment in Specific Deterrence, Paper Presented at the Annual Law 
and Society Association Meeting (1987)); infra Part III.B (discussing other studies); see also 
supra text accompanying notes 211–214 (noting Minnesota Tax Compliance Experiment’s 
finding that the audit letter had a positive effect on individuals who had had their prior 
year’s taxes adjusted but a negative effect on those who had paid a penalty that prior year). 
 259. See, e.g., Luigi Mittone, Dynamic Behavior in Tax Evasion: An Experimental Approach, 
35 J. SOCIO-ECON. 813, 814 (2006). 
 260. Id. at 816–18. One can think of those sixty rounds as corresponding to sixty years’ 
worth of tax filing in the life of an individual. 
 261. Students typically have little taxpaying experience. A recent study in the United 
Kingdom conducted a taxpaying experiment on 200 students, 200 individuals who work as 
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was assigned an amount of gross income in a round, told the 
amount of taxes due, and notified with a pop-up window each time 
the audit probability for the next three rounds changed.262 The 
experimenter, Luigi Mittone, randomly determined the audited 
rounds in advance.263 However, each audit entailed an audit of that 
round plus the previous three rounds.264 Mittone tested the effect 
of several factors, such as informing the participants that the taxes 
collected would be contributed to a scholarship fund.265 
Mittone found, in part, that “the number of evaders was 
noticeably lower in the experiments with redistribution . . . and 
with a public good . . . than it was in those with no moral 
constraint . . . .”266 In addition, he found the striking pattern that 
“there is a sort of constancy in the rounds immediately after a fiscal 
audit, which is almost always followed by a systematic increase in 
tax evasion.”267 He termed this the “bomb crater effect.”268 This 
 
employees and have their income fully reported by the employer and do not have to file a 
tax return, and 120 self-employed individuals who are required to file returns. C.Y. Lawrence 
Choo et al., Do Students Behave Like Real Taxpayers in the Lab? Evidence from a Real Effort Tax 
Compliance Experiment, 214 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 102, 103 (2016). It found that, in the low-
fine treatments, students were the least compliant (p = 0.069). Id. at 108. 
 262. Mittone, supra note 259, at 819. The income assigned to participants ranged from 
0.36 Euro cents to 0.51 Euro cents in different rounds. The tax rate was 20, 30, or 40% in each 
round. The penalty for evasion was 4.5 times the evaded taxes. Id. at 818. 
 263. Id. at 819 (“rounds 13, 31, 34, 48, 54, 58 for the first group, and rounds 3, 24, 27, 40, 
46, 50 for the second group. . . .”). 
 264. Id. at 818. 
 265. Id. at 820. 
 266. Id. at 821. 
 267. Id. at 823. 
 268. Id. at 824. The term comes from the reported tendency of soldiers in World War I 
to shelter in bomb craters because they believed a bomb was unlikely to fall twice in the same 
place. Id. at 824 n.9. This 2006 article seems to use the term “bomb crater effect” as referring 
to a decline in compliance after an audit that occurs because participants think it’s unlikely 
they’ll experience another audit right away; it states, “This shall be called the ‘bomb crater 
effect’ (BCE): the subjects decide to evade immediately after a fiscal audit because they 
believe that it cannot happen twice in the same place (time).” Id. at 823–24 (footnote omitted). 
 Subsequently, Maciejovsky explored the possibility that “loss repair” explains the 
observed decline in compliance. See Maciejovsky et al., supra note 244, at 679. In a 2017 article 
Mittone coauthored, the Abstract states, “The experimental literature has identified the 
Bomb Crater Effect (BoCE), i.e., the fact that tax compliance drops immediately after a 
taxpayer is audited. From a theoretical perspective, BoCE has been explained either by the 
misperception of chance, also known as the gambler’s fallacy, or by the loss repair effect.” 
Luigi Mittone et al., The Bomb-Crater Effect of Tax Audits: Beyond the Misperception of Chance, 
61 J. ECON. PSYCH. 225, 225 (2017). This Article uses the term in that later sense, as simply 
describing an observed decline in compliance, without referring to a possible cause. 
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effect, in terms of the median percentage of tax paid, was highly 
statistically significant.269 
A study published the following year attempted to distinguish 
between two possible explanations of the bomb-crater effect: 
misperceived chance and recouping of audit losses.270 Maciejovsky 
et al. recruited students in Vienna for two lab experiments. In the 
first experiment, participants earned income by buying or selling 
assets in a competitive market. “After each trading period, 
participants were asked to declare their earnings, separately for 
sales revenues, resulting from selling assets, and for dividends paid 
for holding assets.”271 Audit probabilities were 15% in one 
treatment and 30% in the other, and the penalty for evasion was 
50% or 100% of the omitted income.272 Maciejovsky et al. found that 
tax compliance was generally higher in the high-audit treatment 
than in the low-audit treatment.273 In addition: 
[C]ompliance decreased sharply after an audit and increased 
slowly in the next three consecutive trading periods in the high-
audit condition. In the low-audit condition compliance decreased 
after an audit steadily. . . . It might well be that observing more 
than four subsequent filing periods would reveal an increase of 
compliance rates also in the low-audit condition. However, our 
design did not allow for such an analysis. These results suggest 
that participants’ compliance decisions are driven by 
misconception of the audit probability, as shown in the literature 
on gambler’s fallacy.274 
In their second experiment, Maciejovsky et al. focused on 
whether the participants truly believed the audits were random.275 
Accordingly, one of the participants rolled a six-sided die, and all 
participants were audited if the roll was a one or a two, yielding a 
one-third chance of audit.276 Participants were also assigned an 
income amount; the tax rate was 40%, and the penalty was 50% of 
 
 269. Mittone, supra note 259, at 825 (p = 0.0000). 
 270. Maciejovsky et al., supra note 244, at 679. 
 271. Id. at 682. 
 272. Id. 
 273. Id. at 684. 
 274. Id. 
 275. Id. at 685–86. 
 276. Id. at 686. 
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undeclared income.277 This experiment also found a bomb-
crater effect.278 
To test whether the bomb-crater effect was driven by loss 
recoupment, the authors examined the effects audits had on 
compliant versus noncompliant participants, presumably because 
noncompliant/penalized participants have greater losses to recoup 
after audit.279 They found no differences.280 Accordingly, because 
they had posited only one alternative explanation—misperceived 
chance—they concluded that misperceived chance drove the 
bomb-crater effect. 
A subsequent lab experiment by Barbara Kastlunger et al. 
investigated the effects on compliance of various patterns of 
repeated audits.281 One of the effects they examined was the bomb-
crater effect, looking at whether it could better be explained by 
misperceived chance or loss recoupment.282 Participants were given 
1000 Experimental Currency Units in each of sixty rounds and told 
that the tax rate was 20%, the audit rate was 15%, and the fine for 
evasion was three times the unpaid tax (in addition to the unpaid 
tax). Each participant was audited nine times. In the control 
condition, the audits were randomly distributed over the sixty 
rounds. Experimental condition 1 (E1) experienced audits in all 
three of the first three rounds, with the remaining six audits in the 
rest of the first twenty rounds.283 Experimental condition 2 (E2) had 
all of the audits concentrated between rounds 20 through 39, so 
 
 277. Id. at 686–87. “The exact amount [of income assigned] was randomly drawn from 
a uniform distribution ranging from 80 ECU [Experimental Currency Units] to 120 ECU, 
whereby 100 ECU was equivalent to 10 Euro.” Id. at 686. 
 278. Id. at 688. (“The average compliance rate dropped from 0.63 in the period of an 
audit to 0.56 immediately after an audit (t(49)=2.51; p<0.05; d=0.72).”). Maciejovsky et al. also 
found that the return to baseline compliance after an audit was a quadratic function. Id. 
 279. Id. (“Loss repair can be detected if the drop of compliance for the dishonest 
taxpayers is significantly more pronounced than the corresponding drop for the 
honest taxpayers.”). 
 280. Id. 
 281. Barbara Kastlunger et al., Sequences of Audits, Tax Compliance, and Taxpaying 
Strategies, 30 J. ECON. PSYCHOL. 405, 405, 408 (2009) (studying economics students at the 
University of Trento). 
 282. Id. at 409. 
 283. Id. at 408. The only consecutive audits after that were in rounds 9 and 10. Id. 
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there were no audits at the beginning or end of the sixty rounds.284 
Experimental condition 3 (E3) had all of its audits in the first twenty 
rounds, but all audits were in even rounds (round 2, round 4, round 
6, etc., through round 18).285 
Overall, Kastlunger et al. found that both previous tax 
payments and fines had a slight positive effect on compliance in the 
next round, and audits had a substantial negative effect, with all of 
these effects significant at p < 0.01.286 Although a bomb-crater effect 
existed for the control group (random audits), and for condition E3 
(the fairly transparent alternating audits), conditions E1 and E2 
lacked that effect. Instead, audits positively predicted compli-
ance.287 Accordingly, Kastlunger et al. determined that consecutive 
audits counter the bomb-crater effect.288 
This suggested to them that misperceived chance causes bomb 
craters. Accordingly, like Maciejovsky, they disaggregated the 
effects of audits on compliant and noncompliant taxpayers in the 
control group.289 They found, 
[f]ocusing on compliant cases in t0 [the audit round], in 52.7% of 
compliant audited cases tax payments were reduced to some 
extent in t1 [the post-audit round] (21.8%) or participants evaded 
completely (30.9%) in t1. By contrast, only in 36.9% of non-
compliant cases at t0 participants reduced their tax payments 
(9.4%) or evaded completely (27.5%) at t1; whereas, 19.4% of the 
non-compliant cases showed increased or total compliance after 
the audit.290 
 
 284. Id. (“[T]here were three audits right at the beginning, whereas the remaining 
audits were positioned between rounds 23 and 39, with two further continuous audits after 
rounds 28 and 29.”). 
 285. Id. 
 286. Id. at 409, 412 tbl.2. For an explanation of p-values, see Darrow, supra note 48. 
 287. Kastlunger et al., supra note 281, at 409, 410 fig.1. 
 288. Id. at 409. 
 289. Id. (“If loss-repair accounts for the bomb crater effect, only participants who were 
fined in the audit round (t0) should increase evasion in the following round (t1), whereas 
compliant participants should tend to remain compliant.”). Compliant taxpayers could 
actually try to recoup the loss of the tax paid, but they would have less to recoup from that 
round than taxpayers who paid the tax plus a penalty. 
 290. Id.; see also id. at 412 tbl.3. 
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They concluded from this that their results “do not confirm loss-
repair tendencies but suggest misperception of chance.”291 
It is true that those results do not confirm loss repair; audited 
noncompliant taxpayers did not increase their evasion more than 
the audited compliant. However, if the bomb-crater mechanism is 
misperception of the chance of audit, one would expect differences 
in compliant and noncompliant taxpayers’ post-audit behavior to 
result only by chance. Here, the compliant taxpayers showed the 
greater bomb-crater effect. Kastlunger et al. do not report whether 
the differences are statistically significant.292 If they are, it would 
support a distinct effect of audit on compliant taxpayers, an issue 
discussed in the next section. 
Also, what is the actual chance of audit that participants may 
have misperceived? They were told that the audit rate was 15%. 
And in each condition, nine out of sixty rounds were audited, so 
each participant was audited nine times. This is not the same as 
rolling a die, however, where each roll is independent and has the 
same odds. When rolling a die that has a 15% chance of prompting 
an audit, participants might perceive that the likelihood of audit 
diminishes with each audit and even reaches zero after nine audits. 
That would be incorrect. But here, participants who hold those 
beliefs would actually correctly perceive the audit likelihood. 
Kastlunger et al. also found that tax payments decreased after 
participants had not been audited for ten rounds and continued to 
decrease until the experiment ended.293 In order to investigate 
whether a single later audit after a longer period without audits 
would restore compliance to the previous levels, they conducted a 
second experiment, with two conditions. The first condition (E1*) 
was like E1 except that the audit in round 3 was moved to round 
31. The second condition (E2*) followed the same pattern of audits 
 
 291. Id. at 409. Kastlunger et al. also found for noncompliant participants who 
decreased their tax payments the round after audit, “[t]he correlation between experienced 
fines and compliance at t1 was highly significant with r = –.47, p < .01, n = 59, indicating that 
detection and punishment of non-compliance led to lower compliance in the following 
round.” Id. at 411–12. 
 292. See id. at 409, 412 tbl.3. 
 293. Id. at 413. 
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(two consecutive audits, an audit five rounds later, etc.), except 
with the first audit in round 20, so the last audit was in round 51.294 
The authors found that “[t]he average payments per round, as 
well as the sum of honest tax filings, did not differ between the two 
conditions and were similar to Study 1.”295 Audits had no 
significant effect on compliance in E1* but had a positive influence 
in E2*. The authors concluded that two consecutive audits may 
suppress bomb craters and that one audit during a compliance 
decrease may suffice to increase it.296 Thus, Kastlunger et al.’s focus 
was on the timing of audits, rather than on the post-audit behavior 
of compliant and noncompliant taxpayers. 
Those studies used random or predetermined audits. By 
contrast, a lab experiment by James Alm and Jim McKee examined 
the effect on compliance of an endogenous audit rule that 
compared the individual’s compliance level to that of others.297 
Although that study’s focus was on whether participants could 
coordinate on a zero-compliance equilibrium, it included a dummy 
variable for whether the participant was audited in the previous 
round, and found a negative correlation between that and 
compliance.298 The authors explained that because the audit rule 
called for auditing the least-compliant participant in that round, 
decreasing compliance “is a best response strategy if the individual 
expects others to lower their compliance because they were not 
audited in the previous round.”299 That study did not disaggregate 
compliant participants, so it is unclear if a particular subset of 
participants was driving that effect. 
A more recent study used a different endogenous-audit rule to 
test whether such an audit rule eliminated bomb craters.300 Emily 
Satterthwaite used Amazon’s Mechanical Turk (an online 
 
 294. Id. at 413–14. 
 295. Id. at 415. 
 296. Id. at 415, 416. 
 297. James Alm & Jim McKee, Tax Compliance as a Coordination Game, 54 J. ECON. BEHAV. 
& ORG. 297 (2004). 
 298. See id. at 309 tbl.3, 310 (not stating whether that effect was statistically significant). 
 299. Id. at 310. 
 300. See Emily Ann Satterthwaite, Can Audits Encourage Tax Evasion?: An Experimental 
Assessment, 20 FLA. TAX REV. 1 (2016). 
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marketplace for workers)301 to recruit mostly non-student U.S. 
participants. The study involved a random audit (the control) and 
an endogenous audit in which likelihood of audit was determined 
by whether the previous audit found the taxpayer noncompliant 
(the treatment).302 
Each condition had sixty rounds, although participants were 
told the study would last at least sixty-two rounds, so as to avoid a 
“last period” effect. In each round, participants were endowed with 
$800 to $1200 of “extra income” on which taxes were due. The tax 
rate was 30%, the average audit probability (over all participants) 
was 10%, and the penalty was 100% of unpaid taxes (plus the 
unpaid taxes).303 Participants in the treatment group were told, 
“Audits occur with a probability of 10 percent. If you do not report 
all of your income, and you are chosen for audit, your unreported 
income will be detected with certainty. Moreover, you will be 
‘flagged’ for audit in subsequent periods.”304 
Satterthwaite found that average compliance rates in the 
treatment group were higher, in every period, than under the 
random-audit rule.305 In both conditions, compliance decreased 
 
 301. See AMAZON MECHANICAL TURK, https://www.mturk.com/mturk/welcome 
(last visited Oct. 16, 2018). 
 302. Satterthwaite, supra note 300, at 9. Random audits were scattered throughout the 
experiment. Id. In the treatment group, if the random audit showed full reporting, the 
participant remained subject to random audit. If the random audit showed cheating, that 
participant was audited again in the next period. Id. A participant ceased to be subject to 
random audits after being audited six times. Id. 
 303. Id. at 45. 
 304. Id. at 47. The details of the “flagging” were not disclosed to participants but were 
as follows: 
[1.] [I]f the initial audit reveals that she reported all her income truthfully, she will 
be returned to the random IID [independent and identically distributed] audit 
lottery. 
[2.] If the initial audit reveals underreported income, she will be audited again in 
the immediately succeeding period. 
[3.] If the repeat audit reveals evasion, there is another repeat audit. This 
conditional audit process continues until the participant has reached the cap of six 
audits. After the sixth audit, the participant faces no more audits . . . . 
[4.] Note that, following any audit other than the sixth, where an audit reveals 
truthful reporting, the participant is returned to the pool of participants selected 
for audit through the ten percent IID random process. 
Id. at 48. 
 305. Id. at 54. 
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over time, although somewhat more so under random audits.306 
Satterthwaite found evidence of a bomb-crater effect for the control 
group, although in the first half of the experiment there were eight 
periods in which average post-audit compliance was higher than 
average pre-audit compliance.307 For the treatment group, after 
about round 10, average post-audit compliance exceeded pre-audit 
compliance and in many periods approached or attained perfect 
compliance.308 However, in the first half of the experiment, there 
were eight periods in which the treatment group, on average, 
exhibited a bomb-crater effect.309 She concluded that a known 
endogenous-audit rule eliminated a bomb-crater effect following 
the first audit.310 
Satterthwaite also investigated the effect of consecutive 
audits.311 In the control condition, after one random audit, 
compliance dropped by almost 10 percentage points. After a second 
random audit in a row, compliance increased by approximately 7 
percentage points. After a third, compliance increased by 12 
percentage points, and after four random audits in a row, it 
increased by about 2 percentage points and began to plateau.312 By 
contrast, the treatment condition, in which participants had been 
told that detected cheating would be a flag for audit, did not begin 
with a bomb crater. 313 Instead, after the first audit, compliance rose 
by 5 percentage points. After a second consecutive audit, 
compliance decreased by approximately 2 percentage points.314 
After a third consecutive audit, compliance increased by almost 7 
percentage points, and after the fourth audit in a row, it decreased 
slightly.315 Thus, in the endogenous audit treatment, Satterthwaite 
 
 306. Id. 
 307. Id. at 55. 
 308. Id. at 56. 
 309. Id. 
 310. Id. at 63. 
 311. In the control group, even a compliant taxpayer could experience consecutive 
audits. In the treatment group, a compliant taxpayer could also be selected at random for a 
consecutive audit. 
 312. Satterthwaite, supra note 300, at 61. 
 313. Id. 
 314. Id. 
 315. Id. 
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found an increase in compliance after the first audit but alternating 
effects for subsequent audits.316 
Satterthwaite’s results provide support for presenting audits as 
non-random. They may provide some support for repeated audits, 
as does the Kastlunger et al. study discussed above317 and the 
DeBacker et al. study of IRS (non-random) audits of corporate 
taxpayers.318 However, it is hard to know what is driving the alter-
nating increases and decreases in compliance in Satterthwaite’s 
endogenous audit group.319 
Professor Satterthwaite’s experiment initially did not separate 
out compliant from noncompliant taxpayers, and her published 
article does not report any results relating to those subgroups. 
However, she conducted a basic subgroup analysis in response to 
my inquiry. Specifically, for each of the audit conditions, she 
calculated average compliance in round t1 (the post-audit round) of 
four groups: (1) those audited in round t0 who were compliant in 
that round, (2) those audited in round t0 who were not compliant in 
that round, (3) those not audited in round t0 who were compliant in 
that round, and (4) those not audited in round t0 who were not 
compliant in that round.320 
When Professor Satterthwaite compared the two subgroups in 
the random audit condition who were compliant in round t0, she 
found less than 100% compliance in round t1 for both of those 
subgroups. The subgroup that had not been audited in round t0 had 
 
 316. Id. Repeated audits may have various effects. For example, a lab experiment found 
that “the number of audits had a significant and negative effect on tax evasion in the last 
round.” Michael W. Spicer & Rodney E. Hero, Tax Evasion and Heuristics: A Research Note, 26 
J. PUB. ECON. 263, 266 (1985) (p < 0.02). 
 317. See supra text accompanying note 296. 
 318. See DeBacker et al., supra note 216, at 311 (“These results imply that firms are much 
less tax aggressive after a second audit than they are after the first audit, which suggests that 
they have revised their audit probability upward.”). 
 319. In part, that may be regression to the mean. See Susan B. Long, Commentary on 
Brian Erard, The Influence of Tax Audits on Reporting Behavior, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: 
TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 115, 119 (Joel Slemrod ed., 1992) (stating with respect 
to a 1992 study, “[h]ad Erard selected taxpayers whose initial audit results were ‘extreme’ in 
the opposite direction (taxpayers initially highly compliant), he would have doubtless found 
a similar regression toward the mean with these taxpayers becoming less compliant after 
their initial audit”); cf. Erard, supra note 258, at 100–01 (acknowledging that point). 
 320. See Email from Emily Satterthwaite, Professor, Univ. of Toronto, to author (Dec. 
19, 2017) (on file with author). 
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an average compliance rate of 0.929 in round t1. This decrease from 
100% compliance despite the lack of audit suggests that regression 
to the mean explains at least part of the post-audit decline in 
compliance.321 The average compliance among these two sub-
groups of compliant taxpayers was lower for those who were 
audited, however, with the audited subgroup having an average 
compliance rate of 0.820, suggesting that the audit had a 
negative effect.322 
In Satterthwaite’s endogenous audit condition, the same 
pattern occurred, but the difference between the round t1 
compliance rates was smaller: an average compliance rate of 0.940 
for the not-audited who were compliant in round t0 and an average 
of 0.915 for the audited who were compliant in round t0.323 The 
greater decline in compliance in round t1 by those audited in round 
t0 compared to those not audited in round t0 also suggests that 
experiencing an audit has a negative effect on next-round 
compliance. Thus, Satterthwaite’s findings in this regard are 
consistent with other laboratory experiments that found a bomb-
crater effect immediately after audit.  
B. Field Experiments on Post-Audit Compliance 
The laboratory experiments discussed above generally focus on 
the effects of audits on all audited participants. By contrast, field 
experiments have raised the prospect of a post-audit decline in 
compliance only of the subgroup of individual taxpayers found 
compliant on audit.324 First, a U.K. field experiment examined the 
effects of audits on three categories of unincorporated taxpayers: 
medium businesses, small businesses, and personal taxpayers.325 
 
 321. See supra note 319; infra text accompanying notes 396–403. 
 322. See Email from Emily Satterthwaite, supra note 320. 
 323. Id. 
 324. See, e.g., Marcelo Bergman & Armando Nevarez, Do Audits Enhance Compliance? 
An Empirical Assessment of VAT Enforcement, 59 NAT’L TAX J. 817, 821, 825 (2006) (examining 
the effects of audits on VAT compliance in Chile and Argentina). 
 325. Norman Gemmell & Marisa Ratto, Behavioral Responses to Taxpayer Audits: Evidence 
from Random Taxpayer Inquiries, 65 NAT’L TAX J. 33, 41 (2012) (“[T]hough the M- and S-
segments may be thought to be similar, many small businesses—those with a turnover of 
less than £15,000—are akin to personal taxpayers with some self-employment income.”). 
“Each segment consists of around 2,500–3,000 individuals, of which around 20–25 percent 
were audited.” Id. at 43. 
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The study’s authors, Norman Gemmell and Marisa Ratto, 
compared taxpayers randomly audited in 2000 with taxpayers who 
were not and looked at tax reported by these taxpayers for the three 
years before and after 2000.326 Overall, the study found no 
statistically significant effects of the audit, before separating out 
subgroups of taxpayers.327 Gemmell and Ratto then looked sepa-
rately at the medium businesses, small businesses, and personal 
taxpayers and divided them into “compliant” and “noncompliant” 
based on the audit results.328 
The study found a positive effect of audits on the tax reported 
by taxpayers found noncompliant but a negative effect on the tax 
reported by taxpayers found compliant.329 As far as the magnitude 
of a possible negative effect of audit on subsequent compliance, 
Gemmell and Ratto explain that “for Personal taxpayers identified 
as compliant, declared tax fell due to audit by about 7 percent on 
average over 2001–2003.”330 The effects on small and medium 
businesses were larger (11% and 17%, respectively), but with larger 
margins of error.331 The positive effects of audits on taxpayers 
whose returns were adjusted were generally of greater magnitude: 
5%, 24%, and 18% for personal taxpayers, small businesses,  
and medium business respectively.332 Gemmell and Ratto  
hypothesized that the stronger compliance response by businesses 
than by personal taxpayers reflects their greater opportunity to 
evade taxes.333 
 
 326. Id. at 42. They state: “To minimize the likelihood that previous or future audits 
influence observed reactions to the 2000 audit, we excluded all taxpayers who were audited 
in these six years (1997–1999, 2001–2003).” Id. at 41. Looking at years prior to the audit should 
help give a more complete picture of a taxpayer’s overall compliance level. 
 327. Id. at 47; cf. Bergman & Nevarez, supra note 324, at 821 (finding in Chile and 
Argentina that, overall, audits had no effect on compliance). 
 328. Gemmell & Ratto, supra note 325, at 42. Of the 2006 audited taxpayers, they found 
1342 (66.9%) compliant and 664 (33.1%) noncompliant. See id. at 42 tbl.2. The control group 
contained 6420 unaudited taxpayers. See id. 
 329. Id. at 48 (“In all cases positive parameters are obtained for the noncompliant group 
and negative parameters are obtained for the compliant group.”). The authors recognize and 
control for the fact that although the audited group and control group are selected randomly, 
the subgroups of audited compliant and audited noncompliant are not. Id. at 45–46. They do 
not have subgroups of unaudited compliant and noncompliant. See id. 
 330. Id. at 50. 
 331. Id. at 49 tbl.5. 
 332. Id.  
 333. Id. at 55. 
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In this study, only some of the effects were statistically 
significant, however. For example, in the “Before/after 2000” 
regression, for those found compliant, while the coefficient for 
personal taxpayers was significant at p < 0.05, the coefficient for 
medium businesses was not significant, and the one for small 
businesses was significant only at p < 0.10.334 Gemmell and Ratto 
explain that “[u]nsurprisingly perhaps, the negative preventive 
effects for the compliant are less robustly estimated for medium 
businesses where they are a smaller fraction of the audited.”335 
Overall, they concluded that any negative effect of random audits 
on noncompliant taxpayers should be weighed against the 
beneficial indirect effects of these audits.336 
In the United States, DeBacker et al. used IRS data to study the 
effects of random audits on individuals’ tax compliance.337 They 
examined data from years 2006, 2008, and 2009 of the IRS National 
Research Program,338 which runs the random audits the IRS 
conducts to update the formula it uses to score returns on their 
likelihood of noncompliance. This was a much larger study than 
Gemmell and Ratto’s, with billions of observations.339 Overall, 
DeBacker et al. found that audits had positive effects: they 
 
 334. Id. at 47 tbl.4. The other specification was “Before 2000/after inquiry closure.” Id. 
In that regression, the coefficients for compliant personal taxpayers and medium businesses 
were significant at p < 0.01, and the coefficient for compliant small businesses was not 
statistically significant. Id. 
 335. Id. at 48. 
 336. Id. at 53, 55. 
 337. Jason DeBacker et al., Once Bitten, Twice Shy? The Lasting Impact of IRS Audits 
on Individual Tax Reporting 1 (Jan. 16, 2016) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with 
the author). 
 338. Id. at 10. 
 339. Id. at 35 tbl.1 (reporting 4.36 billion observations for the NRP sample and 
4.33 billion observations for the random sample). For the NRP sample, DeBacker et al. report 
404,252,738 observations in the base (NRP-audit) year, of which 164,338,287 had a positive 
adjustment to tax liability and 29,778,483 had a negative adjustment. Id. There were 
210,135,968 no-change returns, comprising 51.98% of the total. Id. This contrasts with general 
data reported by the IRS, which for 2015 shows an overall no-change rate for individual 
income tax returns of 9% for field audits and 12% for correspondence audits. DEP’T OF THE 
TREASURY, INTERNAL REVENUE SVC., INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE DATA BOOK, 2015, at 1, 24 
tbl.9a (Mar. 2016), https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/15databk.pdf. 
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increased reported taxable income, a statistically significant 
effect,340 and that increase persisted over time.341  
DeBacker et al. also separately examined the effect on reported 
taxable income on taxpayers whose random audit resulted in a 
positive adjustment, a negative one, or no adjustment.342 They 
found that for taxpayers with a positive adjustment, taxable income 
increased in the first and second years post-audit, and it stayed 
elevated through the final year they reported, year six.343 The 
results for that group were statistically significant.344 
For taxpayers whose audit resulted in no adjustment either 
way, DeBacker et al. found that taxable income declined the first 
year post-audit—which is consistent with a bomb-crater effect—
increased to the audit-year level in the second year post-audit, 
gradually increased through year four, then declined slightly in the 
fifth and sixth years, ending a bit above where it started.345 
However, in contrast to the results for taxpayers whose  
returns had been adjusted, these results generally were not 
statistically significant.346 
 
 340. DeBacker et al., supra note 337, at 18–19 (“[A]udits increase reported taxable 
income by $1,109, which is statistically significant at the 1% level.”); see also id. at 30–31 (“The 
results from a simple difference-in-differences specification indicate that an audit increases 
reported taxable income by more than $1,100 per year, equivalent to 2.9% of the 
average income.”). 
 341. Id. at 17 (“Reported taxable income increases in the first and second years after an 
audit and remains elevated even after six years. Adjusted gross income (AGI) and wage 
income follow a similar pattern to that of taxable income.”). 
 342. Id. at 45 fig.4. 
 343. Id. (showing progressive increases in the first and second years post-audit, a 
gradual decline in years three through five to about the level of the first post-audit year, and 
a leveling off in year six). 
 344. Id. at 19 (“We see the strongest and most statistically significant response from the 
group with positive adjustments. Almost all the coefficients for the other two groups are 
statistically insignificant and have much lower point estimates than for the positive 
adjustment group.”). 
 345. Id. at 45 fig.4. The figure shows “Change in Reported Taxable Income,” which is 
thus 0 in the year of audit. In the first post-audit year, the change in this group relative to the 
audit year is about -650; in the second, close to 0; in the third, about 450; in the fourth, about 
650; in the fifth, about 600; and in the sixth, about 450. See id. 
 The results for the negative adjustment group (those who were found on audit to have 
overcomplied) essentially zigzagged from increase to decrease and back: the change in this 
group relative to the year of audit was about 1750 in year 1, a slightly negative figure in year 
2, about 800 in year 3, about 1900 in year 4, about -600 in year 5, and about 1100 in year 6. 
See id. 
 346. Id. at 19. 
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Another U.S. study using IRS data, and similar in design to the 
U.K. study, found a negative effect of audit on taxpayers found 
compliant on audit, as the U.K. study did. This U.S. study, 
conducted by Sebastian Beer et al., was commissioned by the 
National Taxpayer Advocate (NTA), Nina Olson, and analyzed the 
forward-looking effects of IRS audits of self-employed taxpayers’ 
2007 returns.347 The main design difference between the NTA’s 
study and the U.K. study was that the audits included in the NTA’s 
study were not random; the returns had been selected for audit in 
the ordinary course, which generally is based on likelihood 
of noncompliance.348 
Overall, like Gemmell and Ratto’s UK study, the NTA’s study 
found a positive effect of audit on subsequent reporting. First, for 
all taxpayers in the sample (compliant or not), taxable income was 
20% higher than the control (unaudited) group three years after 
audit.349 Second, that effect was more pronounced for the subgroup 
of taxpayers who were assessed additional taxes on audit: “[O]ne 
year after having undergone enforcement activity, [they] . . . report 
approximately 250 percent more in taxable income than taxpayers 
in the control group. Three years after the audit, the estimated 
differential remains quite high at 120 percent.”350 These  
results initially suggest that audits may be most beneficial where  
 
 347. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 181, at 67 n.1, 78. The study was conducted 
by Sebastian Beer, Matthias Kasper, Erich Kirchler, and Brian Erard. Id. at 67. It compared “a 
random sample of 2,204 Schedule C filers with under $200,000 in total positive income who 
were audited subsequent to filing their TY 2007 returns with data for a control sample of 
4,705 who were not audited . . . .” Id. at 71. 
 348. The study notes that “the focus of this study is on taxpayers selected through an 
ordinary operational audit process. . . . Operational audits tend to be targeted towards tax 
returns with a high potential for noncompliance.” Id. 
 349. Id. at 73. Similarly, a study in Denmark found that audits deter evasion the 
following year: “For the full sample, the effect on total net income is 2557 kroner or 30.1 cents 
per additional kroner of audit adjustment. The effect on tax liability is 1375 kroner, 
corresponding to 41.7 cents per dollar of audit adjustment. These estimates are strongly 
significant.” Kleven et al., supra note 126, at 685. That study did not look separately at 
taxpayers found compliant on audit. See generally id. 
 350. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 181, at 72. Like the Gemmell and Ratto 
U.K. study, this study does not separate the control group of unaudited taxpayers by 
compliant and noncompliant. Id. at 71. The NTA’s study uses “a Matched Difference-in-
Differences estimator” to address this problem. Id. at 76. 
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they are most needed, at least with respect to U.S. self-
employed taxpayers.351 
With respect to taxpayers found compliant (or over-
compliant352) on audit, however, like Gemmell and Ratto, the NTA 
found a negative effect of audit on subsequent reported taxable 
income.353 In only one of the six specifications, the baseline 
differences-in-differences regression, was the magnitude of the 
decline statistically significant.354 There, three years after audit, 
those taxpayers reported 35.8% less in taxable income than the 
control group, a difference significant at p < 0.05.355 
A lab experiment conducted in the United Kingdom with three 
groups of participants (students, employees, and the self-
employed) also found that compliance decreased after audit, 
including among compliant participants, although the primary 
driver of this effect was the student sample.356 In contrast to these 
studies, a study of the effect of audits on VAT compliance in Chile 
and Argentina found a negative overall effect of audit and a positive 
effect on the audited taxpayers who did not receive an assessment. 
In particular, Marcelo Bergman and Armando Nevarez found that, 
“[o]n average, the non-audited have better compliance than 
audited tax-payers after enforcement.”357 However, in Chile, 38% 
of the taxpayers audited had no assessment, and the audit had a 
 
 351. The study notes that “we cannot rule out that our estimates are influenced by the 
economic downturn in 2008.” Id. at 70. 
 352. The study does not mention overcompliant taxpayers. Taxpayers with no positive 
adjustment (which could include a refund) were labelled as having no tax change. See id. at 
71, 72 (“To avoid confusion . . . , we will refer to . . . the subsample that does not receive an 
additional recommended tax assessment as the no-tax-change experimental group ‘E-NC,’ 
rather than as . . . ‘compliant[]’ . . . .”). 
 353. See id. at 86, tbl.5. 
 354. See id. (reporting six regressions and specifying statistically significant results at 
the 0.01, 0.05, and 0.10 levels). 
 355. Id. at 86. The Executive Summary reports that “[t]he [thirty-five percent] difference 
is significant at the one percent level.” Id. at 69. This seems to be an error. 
 356. Choo et al., supra note 261, at 112 (p < 0.001) (“Starting with the case where the 
subject was not evading in period t, we observe a negative and highly significant coefficient 
on Not Evadeit × Auditedit−1, indicating that expected compliance goes down in the period 
subsequent to an audit taking place. . . . In short, we find evidence for the bomb-crater 
effect in our experiment, but that effect is driven primarily by the student sample.” 
(citations omitted)).  
 357. Bergman & Nevarez, supra note 324, at 821. 
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positive effect on that group.358 (The authors were unable to 
conduct the same analysis for Argentina, where only 2% of the 
taxpayers did not receive assessments on audit.359) 
It is possible that a country in which noncompliance is high may 
result in different taxpayer behavior.360 However, the recent study 
in Italy361 by Mazzolini et al. also found similar results to those of 
the NTA and Gemmel and Ratto. Mazzolini et al. studied audits of 
self-employed taxpayers in the ordinary course. They found that 
“[r]eported income increases on average by approximately 
8.2 percent after audits”362 and remains higher for three years after 
audit.363 Like the NTA, they found a negative effect on the 
subgroup of compliant taxpayers for the year after audit.364 
However, that result was statistically insignificant.365 
Mazzolini et al. find the result with respect to compliant 
taxpayers expected366 and “consistent with the predictions of the 
 
 358. Id. at 826, 829. At the beginning of the article, the authors state that in Chile, 
“approximately 22 percent of VAT fails to be collected, while in neighboring Argentina tax 
evasion is roughly double.” Id. at 817–18. However, they do not consider taxpayers who were 
not assessed on audit necessarily compliant; they state, “We assume that there is no perfect 
compliance. It appears that most taxpayers cheat; however, the difference is in the size of 
noncompliance. Those who were not sanctioned appear to be small–scale cheaters.” Id. at 
824 n.14. 
 359. Id. at 826. The percentage was so high in part because audits were not random. See 
id. at 820. 
 360. Id. at 829–30 (“[U]nder the noncompliance equilibrium (as in Argentina), 
enforcement fails to enhance specific deterrence and very likely fails to achieve general 
deterrence as well.”). 
 361. “Italy is known to be a country with low tax morale, where tax amnesties are 
frequent and institutions (including the tax administration) are relatively less efficient than 
those operating in other developed countries.” Mazzolini et al., supra note 215, at 30. 
 362. Id. at 7. 
 363. Id. at 22. Similarly, a study of Armenia found that “[f]ollowing an audit, firms 
respond by increasing reported income (sub-figure 13a). The magnitude of this response 
amounts to an average increase of 9, 17 and 7 percent in the first three years of audit, 
respectively, compared to the pre-audit year.” Zareh Asatryan & Andreas Peichl, Responses 
of Firms to Tax, Administrative and Accounting Rules: Evidence from Armenia 30–31 (CESifo, 
Working Paper No. 6754, Nov. 2017), https://ideas.repec.org/p/ces/ceswps/_6754.html. 
However, “every additional dollar of reported income in years t to t+1 is, on average, 
matched by a 0.90 dollar increase in reported deductions.” Id. at 31. This result is consistent 
with Carrillo et al., Dodging the Taxman: Firm Misreporting and Limits to Tax Enforcement, 9 AM. 
ECON. J. APPLIED ECON. 144 (2016). See id. at 146 (“[F]irms increased reported costs by 96 cents 
for every dollar of revenue adjustment.”). 
 364. Mazzolini et al., supra note 215, at 23. 
 365. Id. 
 366. Id. at 6–7. 
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standard [(deterrence)] model of tax compliance.”367 They explain 
that, in a no-change audit, “we expect a downward revision of the 
probability assigned by the cheating taxpayer to the success of tax 
inspectors in discovering evasion.”368 In other words, before the 
audit, the average taxpayer likely expected to owe some positive 
amount after audit. After experiencing an audit outcome of owing 
nothing (or even receiving a refund), that taxpayer should be 
expected to revise that expectation downward. Thus, “[a]ccording 
to the rational taxpayer model, on average the effect on future 
reported income should be lower than in the positive-adjustment 
case.”369 That is, if deterrence works, an audited taxpayer who is 
found to owe more tax should be more deterred from noncompli-
ance than an audited taxpayer who is found to owe nothing. 
Note that the focus here is on specific deterrence—that is, the 
effect on the audited taxpayer. The regime-level effect of audit rates 
is the focus of many studies, and many studies do not separate out 
the effects on those actually experiencing an enforcement action.370 
But for a taxpayer who actually experiences an audit, if the audit 
results in no additional tax (let alone a penalty), it is intuitive that 
that reduces the deterrent effect of audits to that taxpayer (that is, the 
specific-deterrent effect), at least for some period of time. 
This analysis reflects a learning effect—at a minimum learning 
from the audit outcome. It may also reflect learning from the audit 
experience ways in which noncompliance was effective or likely 
would not be detected.371 As Kleven et al. noted, audits provide 
information to taxpayers, particularly with respect to the perceived 
likelihood of detection.372 
In addition, taxpayers who were audited and found not to owe 
more tax may infer that the likelihood of audit for the next few 
 
 367. Id. at 23. 
 368. Id. at 6. 
 369. Id. 
 370. See supra notes 61, 68, and 219 (pointing this out). 
 371. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 181, at 69–70 (“This newfound awareness 
of opportunities for reporting and paying lower taxes combined with a low perceived future 
audit risk could drive some taxpayers to report less income on subsequent returns.”); cf. 
Mazzolini et al., supra note 215, at 24 (“[I]n the case of cheating taxpayers, we expect a 
downward revision of the perceived probability that tax inspectors are successful in 
discovering evasion.”). 
 372. Kleven et al., supra note 126, at 681; see also Gemmell & Ratto, supra note 325, at 55. 
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years is low.373 Endogenous audits—where audit selection is not 
random—suggest a decreased likelihood of a quick second audit of 
a taxpayer who was found compliant, leading to a seemingly “safe” 
period for noncompliance.374 In theory, that should not be true for 
random audits, but people may misperceive the likelihood of a 
random event recurring.375 In other words, after an audit where the 
taxpayer was found compliant, the taxpayer may reduce the 
perceived likelihood of an audit for the next few years, reducing the 
perceived probability of detection. Under the deterrence model, 
this could reduce the taxpayer’s expected cost of evasion.376 
Note that the explanations regarding learning and a “safe 
period” do not need to disaggregate the subgroup of audited no-
change taxpayers into those who were actually compliant and those 
who were in fact noncompliant but simply did not get caught. It is 
possible that any of the taxpayers in this subgroup expect that the 
likelihood of audit in the future is low (whether they were actually 
compliant or not).377 It also is possible that any of these taxpayers 
learned from the audit a “safe” method of cheating, although this 
likely is most true of taxpayers who were actually noncompliant, in 
that they directly observed noncompliance going undetected. 
The NTA offered three possible explanations for her finding 
that audited taxpayers who were not found to owe more tax 
reduced their subsequent tax payments. One combines the “safe 
 
 373. Mazzolini et al., supra note 215, at 23–24 (“[T]he taxpayer . . . [may] think[] that, 
after a null-outcome [(no-change)] audit, she is removed, for some time at least, from the set 
of taxpayers targeted by the [tax agency].”); NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 181, at 
70 (referring to a “low perceived future audit risk”). 
 374. This approach is supported by the pattern observed by Kastlunger et al. in their 
first lab experiment: “The behavior of the participants . . . reminds [sic] of a ‘cops and 
robbers’ situation. When participants expected audits, they were compliant and, to a great 
extent, they evaded when they felt ‘safe.’” Kastlunger et al., supra note 281, at 413 
(citation omitted). 
 375. This concept underlies the term “bomb-crater effect” and is similar to the belief 
that lightning doesn’t strike twice in the same place. See supra note 269. 
 376. See supra text accompanying notes 103–104. 
 377. Mazzolini et al., supra note 215, at 23 (“A null-outcome [(no-change)] audit may 
occur either if the taxpayer was actually compliant and AE [(Agenzia delle Entrate, the Italian 
tax agency)] acknowledges this or if the taxpayer evaded taxes and AE was not able to 
uncover evasion. In either case, the taxpayer has no reason to increase her subsequent income 
reports . . . .”); NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 181, at 70 (referring to a “low 
perceived future audit risk”). 
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period” and “safe methods” hypotheses described above.378 
Another one focuses on (presumably) compliant taxpayers and 
hypothesizes that they experienced a reduction in tax morale.379 
This might be termed the “crowding-out hypothesis,” as it focuses 
primarily on compliant taxpayers and suggests that extrinsic 
enforcement crowded out intrinsic motivations (a crowding-out 
effect). The third explanation is that cheaters were emboldened by 
not having been caught on audit.380 
Of course, there may have been a mix of fully compliant 
taxpayers and noncompliant taxpayers. A field experiment such as 
this one cannot distinguish between actual compliance and 
noncompliance that was not detected on audit because the auditors 
do not know the actual amount of tax due. In this respect, 
laboratory experiments are particularly helpful because the experi-
menter perceives actual compliance levels. While Maciejovsky et al. 
found no difference in the post-audit compliance rates of those 
compliant or noncompliant in the audit round,381 the results of the 
Kastlunger et al. lab experiment testing repeated audits, discussed 
above,382 could suggest that taxpayers who were actually compliant 
when audited tend to decrease their compliance post-audit. 
However, that study involved audits at predetermined times, 
rather than audit selection based on the taxpayer’s likelihood of 
evasion. Satterthwaite’s data, by contrast, found a lower com-
pliance rate in the round after audit by the noncompliant than by 
the fully compliant.383 
 
 378. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 181, at 70. 
 379. Id. at 69 (“[A]n experience of coercive enforcement activity could reduce tax 
morale among (seemingly) compliant taxpayers . . . .”). 
 380. Id. at 69–70 (“[T]he observed reduction in reported income may be attributable to 
noncompliant taxpayers whose misreporting was not detected during the audit. 
Experiencing an audit that results in no recommended additional tax assessment may 
embolden such taxpayers to become even more noncompliant in the future.”). 
 381. Maciejovsky et al., supra note 244, at 688; see also supra text accompanying notes 
271–273 (summarizing this study). 
 382. See Kastlunger et al., supra note 281, at 409, 412 tbl.3. 
 383. That was true in both the random audit and endogenous audit conditions, but the 
compliance rates in both the audit round and the next round were higher in the endogenous 
audit condition. See Attachment to Email from Emily Satterthwaite, Professor, Univ. of 
Toronto, to author (May 12, 2016) (on file with author). The details are as follows: 
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Given the fact that the overall misreporting percentage for the 
group of taxpayers involved in the NTA’s study (self-employed 
taxpayers) is much higher than average,384 it seems likely that at 
least some of the taxpayers labelled compliant were actually 
noncompliant.385 In addition, the fact that the majority of taxpayers 
audited by the IRS, at least according to the DeBacker study,386 are 
found compliant supports that idea, assuming that the IRS’s 
selection criteria are at all effective. To the extent that some of the 
taxpayers whose returns were not adjusted to owe more tax were 
actually noncompliant, failing to detect that noncompliance means 
that the audit not only left money on the table for that tax year, it 
may have emboldened these taxpayers to increase their evasion in 
subsequent years.387 
Note that there is another possible category of taxpayers in this 
subgroup, which the three explanations the NTA offers do not 
address: overcompliers. In the NTA’s study, all taxpayers with no 
“additional recommended tax assessment” were grouped 
together.388 Taxpayers who correctly received a refund are 
 
                                       Compliance in Round t1 
 Audited in round t0 
& found compliant 
Audited in round t0 
& found noncompliant 
Random audit 0.820 (n=340) 0.400 (n=290) 
Endogenous audit 0.915 (n=421) 0.805 (n=114) 
Id. 
 384. Income subject to no information reporting has an estimated compliance rate of 
only 37%, compared to an average rate of almost 82% and a high of 99% for income subject 
to both withholding and substantial information reporting. See INTERNAL REVENUE SVC., 
supra note 113, at 3; supra text accompanying note 113; supra text accompanying notes 129–
130. Self-employed taxpayers have a high opportunity to evade taxes. Mazzolini et al., supra 
note 215, at 10. 
 385. Cf. Morse et al., supra note 126, at 37 (“According to government reports, most 
individuals with business income fail to pay all their taxes, although some appear to cheat 
more than others.”); id. at 67 (concluding that “[c]ash business owners rely on parallel cash 
economies to underreport receipts and thereby evade income, employment and sales taxes”). 
 386. See supra note 339. The Gemmell and Ratto study found a supermajority compliant. 
See supra note 328. However, that was in random audits. See supra text accompanying 
note 326. 
 387. NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 181, at 91. 
 388. See supra note 352. The Italian study by Mazzolini et al. does not mention the 
possibility of taxpayers receiving a refund. See Mazzolini et al., supra note 215, at 9, 48 fig.1 
(audit outcomes). 
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overcompliers. Overcompliant taxpayers are situated differently 
from others in that a reduction from overcompliance does not 
necessarily produce undercompliance. Moreover, those taxpayers’ 
motivations may be different, so disaggregating taxpayers found 
overcompliant would be helpful. The DeBacker et al. study, which 
is also of IRS audits and for a similar time period, though not 
limited to self-employed taxpayers,389 observed a different post-
audit pattern between audited taxpayers who experienced no 
adjustment and taxpayers who received a negative adjustment 
(refund). While the reported taxable income of the former declined 
one year post-audit, then increased for the next few years, the 
reported taxable income of the latter group increased in the first 
year after audit and then generally zigzagged.390 
The NTA’s second proposed explanation, that the audit may 
have reduced tax morale, crowding out intrinsic motivation to pay 
taxes, deserves detailed examination.391 The report does not explain 
why an audit might reduce compliant taxpayers’ intrinsic moti-
vation. One could posit that a compliant taxpayer who is audited 
may feel like a “chump” for complying.392 That is, a compliant 
taxpayer may feel penalized despite (or for) doing the right thing 
or may begin to feel that the government is hapless—wasting 
resources auditing the compliant.393 
 
 389. The NTA studied the effect of audits of the 2007 tax year. See supra note 347 and 
accompanying text. DeBacker et al. studied the IRS’s random (research) audits of the 2006 
through 2009 years. See supra text accompanying notes 337–338. 
 390. See DeBacker et al., supra note 337, at 45 fig.4; see also supra note 345 (reporting 
the numbers). 
 391. The crowding-out hypothesis focuses on taxpayers who have intrinsic motivations 
to comply and were actually compliant in the audit year. Field experiments cannot readily 
distinguish between true and faked compliance, but laboratory experiments can. A lab 
experiment could examine the effect of an audit (whether random or endogenous) that labels 
some participants’ reports “compliant” even when they are not, to see the extent to which 
that has the effect of reducing subsequent compliance (as the deterrence model would 
predict), or whether only audits of truly compliant participants have that effect (as the 
crowding-out theory would predict). 
 392. See Lederman, supra note 70, at 1497–98 (“[S]anctioning people who do not 
contribute to public goods can reassure others that they will not be ‘chumps’ if 
they contribute.”). 
 393. Deterrence can remove that feeling—as long as it is applied to the noncompliant. 
See id. Thus, this hypothesis would not be inconsistent with the fact that audit threats have 
been found to increase compliance. See supra Part I.B.1. Audit threats differ from actual audits 
in that a compliant taxpayer could interpret an audit threat to mean that noncompliant 
taxpayers will be investigated and burdened. The actual audit is a burden even to a 
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However, a follow-up study on taxpayer attitudes commis-
sioned by the NTA394 found that “audited self-employed taxpayers 
perceive higher degrees of procedural justice, information justice, 
interpersonal justice, and distributive justice than the unaudited 
control group.”395 In addition, audited taxpayers who were not 
found to owe more tax reported higher levels on all four categories 
of justice (procedural, informational, interpersonal, and distribu-
tive) than audited taxpayers who had a positive tax adjustment.396 
The same was true of those taxpayers who received a refund.397 
Although these were not the same self-employed taxpayers as in 
the earlier study,398 the survey results suggest that the audit 
experience did not produce negative feelings for self-employed 
taxpayers who were found not to owe more tax, undermining the 
crowding-out hypothesis. 
Moreover, a tax-morale explanation is not needed to explain a 
post-audit decline in tax payments by taxpayers found not to owe 
more tax, once the effect on specific deterrence of a no-change audit 
is considered.399 That is, the absence of a penalty or even tax due is 
not much of a deterrent because it likely reduces the perceived 
sanction. This in itself would reduce deterrence under the 
 
compliant taxpayer because of the time and stress involved, as well as possible financial costs 
of engaging tax advisors. A study in Austria suggests that too much audit supervision can 
backfire by delaying payments. See Katharina Gangl et al., Effects of Supervision on Tax 
Compliance: Evidence from a Field Experiment in Austria, 123 ECON. LETTERS 378, 379–80 (2014) 
(explaining that intervention involving tax authority visits to new firms plus monthly audits 
during the firm’s first year statistically significantly decreased timely payment, but for firms 
paying late, supervision reduced taxes due by an estimated 27 to 50%). 
 394. The study was conducted by Matthias Kasper, Sebastian Beer, Erich Kirchler, and 
Brian Erard. MATTHIAS KASPER ET AL., NAT’L TAXPAYER ADVOCATE & TAXPAYER ADVOCATE 
SERV., Audits, Identity Theft Investigations, and Taxpayer Attitudes: Evidence from a National 
Survey, in 2 TAS RESEARCH AND RELATED STUDIES 148 (2017), https://taxpayeradvocate.irs 
.gov/Media/Default/Documents/2017-ARC/ARC17_Volume2_05_AuditsIDtp.pdf. 
 395. Id. at 163. 
 396. Id. at 166 fig.5.8; see also id. at 180 app. A (relevant questions and numerical scale). 
 397. Id. 
 398. The study included “2,729 self-employed taxpayers (1,363 audited and 1,366 non-
audited) . . . .” Id. at 159. Among other selection criteria, the audited taxpayers “[h]ad an 
operational audit between tax years 2010 and 2015.” Id. at 158. (The earlier study compared 
a “random sample of 2,204 Schedule C filers . . . who were audited subsequent to filing their 
TY 2007 returns with data for a control sample of 4,705 who were not audited.” NAT’L 
TAXPAYER ADVOCATE, supra note 181, at 71.) 
 399. See supra text accompanying notes 361–365. 
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deterrence model,400 but the effect is compounded when it is 
combined with the “safe period” notion discussed above; a 
taxpayer who was audited and not found to owe more tax might 
very well reduce the perceived likelihood of audit in the 
near future.401 
It is also worth noting that some compliant taxpayers’ 
subsequent evasion may be regression to the mean.402 That is, an 
audit is a snapshot of one particular year. Such a snapshot may not 
entirely capture a taxpayer’s behavior over time. For example, a 
taxpayer may report 90% of income, on average, but report some-
what more in some years—perhaps even 100%—and somewhat 
less in others. In general, at the extreme ends of the distribution, the 
taxpayer’s subsequent behavior is most likely to move closer to the 
mean. And taxpayers audited and found fully compliant approach 
one extreme on the distribution of audit results.403 
A 1988 study conducted by Hessing et al. on Dutch individuals’ 
tax returns supports this idea.404 Although a number of the details 
in the brief report of the study are not fully clear,405 the article 
explains that the Dutch tax authorities checked every tax return 
every year and simply corrected inaccurate returns,406 without 
imposing a penalty.407 Hessing et al. generally found that 
noncompliance in one year predicts noncompliance in a future 
 
 400. See supra text accompanying notes 103–104. 
 401. See supra text accompanying notes 373–374. 
 402. This effect is easier to isolate with a matched group of unaudited fully compliant 
taxpayers, which the U.K. and U.S. studies did not have. However, those studies did use 
statistical techniques to control for the fact that the subgroups of audited compliant and 
audited noncompliant are not randomly assigned. See supra note 329 (U.K. Gemmell and 
Ratto study); supra note 350 (NTA’s U.S. study). 
 403. See Long, supra note 319, at 118. 
 404. See Hessing et al., supra note 112, at 298–304. 
 405. See Richard Bird, Commentary on Dick J. Hessing et al., Does Deterrence Deter? 
Measuring the Effect of Deterrence on Tax Compliance in Field Studies and Experimental 
Studies, in WHY PEOPLE PAY TAXES: TAX COMPLIANCE AND ENFORCEMENT 306, 309 (Joel 
Slemrod ed., 1992) (“[W]ith respect to the second field study reported by the authors, 
unfortunately once again some crucial pieces of information are missing from the highly 
condensed account.”); see also infra note 408. 
 406. Hessing et al., supra note 112, at 298. 
 407. The article explains that the tax authority imposed no penalty unless, after the 
return had been processed, subsequent information that was not available upon initial 
inspection indicated tax evasion. In that case, the tax authority could impose a penalty of 25 
to 100% of the evaded taxes. Id. 
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year.408 Interestingly, the taxpayers whose prior returns were not 
corrected—and thus presumably were found largely compliant by 
the Dutch tax authorities—were found to have in 1986 a 
noncompliance percentage of about 11% and an evasion percentage 
of about 3%.409 Yet these taxpayers apparently did not experience 
any contact from the tax authority.410 Accordingly, it would seem 
that the reduced compliance by those taxpayers had nothing to do 
with an audit. Thus, this study also lends at least limited support to 
the idea that some taxpayers who are found fully compliant in one 
year may not be the next year, regardless of whether they 
are audited. 
Gemmell and Ratto’s U.K. study examined whether having no 
adjustment at all on audit was the key to the result. The authors 
looked at whether taxpayers with a small adjustment behaved 
similarly to taxpayers with no adjustment.411 They found limited 
support for that notion, but the results were not statistically 
significant.412 Thus, that inquiry does not help resolve the question 
of how much of the post-audit effect is specific to fully 
compliant taxpayers. 
Overall, the results of the studies on self-employed or small 
business taxpayers in the United Kingdom, United States, and Italy 
suggest that while undergoing an audit generally increases 
subsequent tax payments, it does not do so for taxpayers found not 
to owe additional tax. In fact, taxpayers in that subgroup may 
 
 408. See id. at 302, 303 fig.2 (also finding that result for tax evasion). Based on the figure, 
the percentages of noncompliance for 1986 in the three groups seem to be about 11% 
(presumably of Dutch Guilders) for taxpayers whose prior returns had not been corrected, 
28% for taxpayers whose returns had contained errors that were corrected, and 36% for 
taxpayers whose prior returns were corrected for tax evasion. The exact numbers are not 
given, and there appears to be a typo on the y-axis, such that 0% should be 10%. Also, the 
discussion and figure are not clear as to which prior year(s) are being compared. See id. 
 409. Id. at 303 fig.2. 
 410. Hessing et al. describe the process as follows: 
  In the Dutch tax system, every single tax form is checked every year. . . . 
When a tax form is found to be incorrect, the tax inspector simply corrects the tax 
form and collects the tax associated . . . . If the (positive) correction takes place 
during the normal processing of the tax form, there is no possibility of 
administering a fine. 
Id. at 298. 
 411. Gemmell & Ratto, supra note 325, at 50. 
 412. Id. at 52. 
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reduce their tax payments. While one could argue that the audit 
experience crowded out intrinsic motivations to pay tax, there is 
little evidence to support that argument. Rather, the result is 
consistent with the deterrence model: a positive outcome is not 
much of a deterrent. 
CONCLUSION 
Given the importance to the government of tax compliance, it is 
important to know whether and when deterrence works. Some 
have suggested that audits or audit threats may backfire.413 
However, not only has an IRS researcher found in a detailed study 
that audits increase tax compliance,414 empirical studies generally 
find that enforcement fosters compliance.415 In part, that may be 
because failing to pursue back taxes simply allows taxpayers to 
ignore the delinquency.416 In addition, enforcement may signal not 
that many taxpayers are evading taxes but rather that few taxpayers 
successfully evade.417 In fact, it is non-enforcement that “sends a 
signal . . . that others do not wish to enforce the tax laws and that 
tax evasion is in some sense socially acceptable, and the social norm 
 
 413. See, e.g., Kahan, supra note 3, at 380–81 (“When the IRS engages in dramatic 
gestures to make individuals aware that it is redoubling its efforts to catch and punish tax 
evaders, it also causes individuals to infer that more taxpayers than they thought are 
choosing to cheat. This inference in turn triggers a reciprocal motive to evade, which 
dominates the greater material incentive to comply associated with the higher than expected 
penalty.” (footnotes omitted)); Mendoza et al., supra note 220 (finding a correlation between 
a higher audit rate in a country and a higher perceived rate of tax evasion); cf. Frey, supra 
note 50, at 387 (reporting that pooled data for Switzerland finds that a higher probability of 
detection correlates with higher tax evasion). 
 414. See Plumley, supra note 155. 
 415. See supra Part II.B. 
 416. See Ryan Briggs, How to Fix Philly’s Poor Tax Collection, PHILLY.COM (July 2, 2015) 
(connecting high delinquency rates in Philadelphia property taxes and business taxes to lack 
of enforcement and difficulties in making payment, and adding, “The city’s liquor tax, hotel 
tax and school income tax . . . similarly rely on self-reporting, and often go uncollected with 
few warnings or penalties.”); see also Chirico et al., supra note 163, at 138 (explaining, 
regarding Philadelphia’s property tax, “In the past, the [Department of Revenue’s] efforts at 
collection from these very tardy taxpayers have been limited to simply remailing the usual 
reminder letter.”). 
 417. See Lederman, supra note 70, at 1497–98; see also Davis et al., supra note 239. 
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of compliance disappears. Such an outcome is common in many 
countries, such as the Philippines and Italy . . . .”418 
The notion that deterrence, perversely, will reduce tax 
compliance generally is not consistent with the ample empirical 
evidence in the United States and elsewhere. For example, the IRS 
finds a positive “shadow” effect on tax collections from each dollar 
collected via enforcement,419 and field studies generally find 
positive effects of audit threats and of audits with prior notice.420 
Several field studies have found evidence in the context of 
unincorporated small business taxpayers of a reduction in reported 
tax liabilities following an audit that did not yield additional tax 
due. This suggests that audits that do not result in a tax payment 
have an opportunity cost not only with respect to that tax year but 
also with respect to several subsequent years for that taxpayer. This 
outcome, while perhaps initially surprising, is consistent with the 
deterrence model; a favorable outcome after audit may lower that 
taxpayer’s perceived likelihood of subsequent audit and the 
perceived magnitude of the sanction. 
In addition, it is important to remember that the overall direct 
effect of audits is increased tax payments by those audited, and the 
positive indirect effect of audits has been estimated to be much 
larger than the direct positive effect of audits. Thus, it would be 
unwise to conclude that reduced enforcement would have a 
positive effect on compliance. In fact, at low audit rates such as 
those in the United States, the evidence suggests that increasing the 
audit rate would increase overall tax compliance. 	  
 
 418. James Alm & Jorge Martinez-Vazquez, Institutions, Paradigms, and Tax Evasion in 
Developing and Transition Countries, in PUBLIC FINANCE IN DEVELOPING AND TRANSITIONAL 
COUNTRIES 146, 151 (Jorge Martinez-Vazquez & James Alm eds., 2003). 
 419. See supra note 182 and accompanying text. 
 420. See supra Part II.B.1. 
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